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In this dissertation, I examined the relationship between two socio-legal and two 
political macro level reforms in South Africa on levels of anti-apartheid, separatist 
and unknown terrorism and fatalities. These reforms were the repeal of the pass laws, 
the repeal of the race classification system, the legalization of formerly outlawed 
political parties and the first democratic election.  The results suggest that socio-legal 
reforms were associated with temporary increases from separatist and unknown 
groups.  As for the political reforms, the election was associated with decreases in 
unknown terrorist attacks and fatalities from all three group types.  Recognizing the 
potential for violence from groups losing power is critical to developing effective 
counter-terrorism strategies, particularly when transitioning from authoritarian to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
Governments implement different strategies to decrease levels of terrorism 
and political violence within their countries.  Much of the counter-terrorism research 
has focused on police, military and deterrence based counter-terrorist measures 
(Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994; Cauley and Im, 1988).  For example, 
intervention analysis has been used to examine the impact of a variety of anti-
terrorism practices, including increasing security of targets such as airports (Landes, 
1978; Enders, Sandler and Cauley, 1990; Dugan, LaFree and Piquero, 2005), air raids 
(Prunckun, Jr. and Mohr, 1996), political assassinations (O’Brien, 1998), and the 
Global War on Terror (Sheehan, 2009).  Fewer studies have examined the impact of 
policy changes in the macro level structure on levels of terrorism and political 
violence (Bachmann and Honke, 2009; Smith, 2000).  This is not surprising, 
considering that much of the research is conducted in nations with democratic or non-
authoritarian political structures.   
Recent events in Northern Africa and the Middle East demonstrate how 
quickly changes can occur in the political, economic and social structures of 
previously authoritarian regimes and some have suggested that the Arab Spring may 
result in the rise of extremism as countries struggle to rebuild their societies in a more 
democratic manner (Mudd, 2011; Wilner, 2011).  Smart (2005) argues that 
containment strategies that do not address underlying or root causes of terrorism may 




socioeconomic and politically oriented strategies.  This is particularly true in cases 
where long-standing, identifiable grievances are present.  Furthermore, terrorist 
violence is political in nature, and it is inappropriate to discount the impact of 
changes on the macro level structure in increasing or decreasing terrorism.  
In considering the changes that are taking place in newly developing 
democracies, an important question arises: what happens to levels of terrorism when 
the basis for conflict is resolved through macro level changes that result in a 
redistribution of power from one dominant group to society as a whole?  In this 
dissertation, I address this question and seek to contribute to the literature on counter-
terrorism interventions by exploring the relationship between macro level political 
and social changes on levels of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorism during 
South Africa’s transition to democracy.  
Overview of the Present Study 
Using time series intervention analysis, I examined the relationship between 
four political and socio-legal interventions on levels of terrorism in South Africa 
between 1970 and 2010.  I relied on insights from theories of intergroup conflict to 
provide the context for my analysis.  According to the power threat hypothesis, the 
dominant group in society generates inter-group conflict by suppressing less powerful 
groups that are perceived as trying to increase their share of power (Blalock, 1967).  
As these subordinate groups make gains in the economic and political spheres, the 
state and/or members of the dominant group may engage in acts of discrimination and 
violence to maintain their privileged position.  In the case of apartheid era South 




power in 1948 and officially implemented the apartheid system.  The preservation of 
the Afrikaner ethnic identity was tied to racial purity, which is why the apartheid 
system focused so heavily on racial categorization. While apartheid policies were 
primarily designed to serve the interests of the Afrikaners, white South Africans of all 
backgrounds benefited from the system by virtue of their skin color.   The apartheid 
era government generated conflict by suppressing non-whites through a system where 
rights and privileges were disturbed along racial lines, especially the black Africans 
who bore the brunt of the negative characteristics of the apartheid system.
1
  
I also use insights from Marsh and Szayna’s (2000) process model for 
anticipating ethnic conflict. According to the model, ethnicity is a social construct 
that can be used for the purposes of collective action and mobilization.  The 
conceptual framework for the model requires one to consider whether there is social 
strife that can manifest into actual violence between ethnic groups (Tellis, Szayna and 
Winnefeld, 1997).  The macro level changes in social structure in South Africa that 
opened previously restricted access to the political, social and economic realms based 
on ethnic identity and racial categorization resulted in inter-group conflict.  The 
conflict morphed into a struggle between politically mobilized groups who wished to 
continue maintaining the primacy of ethnic identity and the racial classification 
system in the face of sweeping changes in the social structure such as the end of 
apartheid and the first democratic election and those who wanted to develop a society 
                                                 
1
Although the Indian and mixed-race populations were an important part of the ethnic/racial groups in 
South Africa, I focus on the dynamic between the white and black populations. Previous research has 
identified intergroup conflict between the blacks and whites as the dominant ethnically-based conflict 
in South Africa (Marsh and Szayna, 2000). Furthermore, I examine acts of terrorism and no Indian or 




in which neither ethnicity nor race had a role in determining access to resources 
(Adam, 1995).   
Relevance of the Present Study 
South Africa continues to be relevant to studies of terrorism in general and 
analyses of intergroup terrorism in particular. Indeed, South Africa was an intensely 
fractured society with seemingly insurmountable divisions along ethnic, racial, social, 
political, and economic lines; yet, the country evolved from an oligarchy (Hanf, 
Weiland and Vierdag 1981) to a multiracial and ethnic democracy, thus far avoiding 
economic disaster, civil war and mass emigration of whites.  The country is often 
cited as a model for change that can be applied to other nations experiencing conflict, 
such as Israel and Iraq.  There is no denying that the transformation was quite 
remarkable (Athiemoolam, 2003); however, South Africa experienced significant 
levels of terrorist violence, particularly during the period of transition, and it would 
be a mistake to ignore this, especially when using South Africa as an exemplar for 
conflict resolution.  
Much of the previous research on grievances and political violence has been 
conducted at the cross-national level and has been cross-sectional (Decker, Galan, 
Johnson, and Wilson, 2010; see LaFree, Morris and Dugan, 2010; Piazza, 2008).   
Previous research has also primarily examined the onset and increase in terrorism, 
rather than the decline of or desistance from terrorism (Sheehan, 2009).  The present 
research improves upon past studies by focusing on a specific country using time 
series data on terrorism.  It also focuses on interventions that were based on 




this study, I conceptualize the macro level changes in socio-legal and political 
structures as interventions, contributing to the research on quantitative studies of 
counter-terrorism measures and complimenting the qualitative work that has been 
conducted on South Africa (Marsha and Syzana, 2000). 
Because this is a case study of one specific country, it is necessary to explore 
the historical origins of the conflict and the associated grievances it produced.  This is 
especially true because I argue that ethnicity was the driving force underlying the 
apartheid system, which may be controversial for some. It is, therefore, important to 
explain the meaning of ethnicity as used in this dissertation, to distinguish it from 
race, and to explain how race served as a proxy for ethnicity in the implementation of 
the apartheid system.  Consequently, in the remainder of this chapter, I distinguish 
between the concepts of race and ethnicity.  I then provide a historical overview of 
the development of ethnicity in South Africa, focusing on the origin and mobilization 
of the Afrikaner ethnic identity.  I then discuss the development of conflict along 
ethnic lines in South Africa, elucidating the manner in which the Afrikaner National 
Party used ethnicity and race to implement apartheid. I conclude with an overview of 
the forthcoming chapters. 
Distinguishing between Race and Ethnicity 
 
The case of South Africa serves as an important example of the fluid nature of 
ethnicity and also the significance of race as an organizing feature of ethnic identity.  
One could argue that the violence in South Africa was the result or racial rather than 




the categorization of the populace as ‘black’, ‘white’ ‘coloured’ and ‘Asian’ (Omond, 
1986:24).  I agree with Marsh and Szayna (2000) and Horowitz (1985; 2000), who 
argue that race is a social construct that is subsumed by ethnicity, and that ethnic 
domination was the foundation of the apartheid state in South Africa.  Ignoring the 
role of ethnicity makes any analysis of South Africa incomplete.  As Bloom (2008) 
noted, unlike the United States, the racial conflict in South Africa was complicated by 
ethnicity and that understanding the dynamic of the apartheid system requires a 
recognition and understanding of the Afrikaner ethnic identity.  Murray and Simeon 
(2007) argued that successful resolution of the South African conflict hinged on the 
ability of the government to address long-standing grievances and accommodate 
ethnic interests while creating a civic society in which access to resources was no 
longer based on ethnic identity.  
Chaves and Guido-DiBrito (1999) distinguish between racial and ethnic 
identity: both concepts are socially constructed, although, racial identity has some 
basis in biology and physical characteristics.  Some take a primordialist view of race, 
believing that it is grounded in biology and that individuals are born into a specific 
racial category based on their genetic makeup, physical appearance and 
characteristics (Spickard, 1992).  In most contemporary societies, skin color is the 
main physical characteristic used to identify an individual’s race (O’Hearn, 1998).  
Ethnic identity relates to one’s identification with members of a community or subset 
of society that has a common history, origin, and culture and that shares the same 




Eller (2006) argues that ethnicity is a complex concept.  He points out that 
ethnicity is indeed a social construct and a subjective notion that is not stable.  
Consequently, perceptions of ethnicity can change over time and across groups 
depending upon present conditions or circumstances.  Additionally, ethnicity is based 
on comparisons made between or among groups.  Indeed, without the aspect of 
comparison, the concept of ethnicity would be fairly meaningless. Finally, he argues 
that ethnicity is a process whereby groups that vary on dimensions such as size, class 
and geographic location form a common identity.   
Mare (1993) defines ethnicity along three dimensions: culture, common 
origin/history, and sense of belonging.  Culture refers to the outward manifestations 
of ethnicity such as style of dress, symbols, language, religion, and values.  These 
elements come to define who may or may not be a member of the ethnic group and 
can vary in importance over time.  He also argues that physical characteristics such as 
skin color can be used as a cultural symbol of ethnicity.  This is particularly true in 
the case of South Africa, where skin color came to signify a hierarchy of access to 
economic and political resources and served as an important identifier of the 
apartheid system.  A common or shared history is also an integral component of 
ethnicity particularly because the past is connected to the present life and identity of 
the ethnic group.  The destiny of the group is often tied to past experiences.  Mare 
(1993) states that the past serves multiple functions, including legitimating the group, 
creating boundaries of the group and enabling action or mobilization.  Finally, the 
sense of belonging to an ethnic group establishes an in-group out-group mentality 




Importantly, ethnicity is often connected to a sense of superiority or 
supremacy over other groups.  Ethnicity can be a positive source of pride and is not 
intrinsically a source of tension or conflict (Bourouh, 2007; McRae, 1997).  It is the 
politicization of ethnicity that can lead to clashes between groups.  The approach in 
this dissertation is that ethnicity is not a stagnant, pre-defined characteristic in the 
primoridalist tradition (Smith, 2000); rather, it is a dynamic, changeable phenomenon 
that can be manipulated and mobilized to serve political purposes.  Furthermore, race 
can become an important part of ethnic identity, especially insofar as physical 
characteristics such as skin color serve as the basis for determining ethnicity.  In 
South Africa, race and ethnicity were intertwined, with race serving as one of the 
primary indicators of the Afrikaner ethnic identity.  As will be discussed below, the 
preservation of white racial purity was one of the pillars of Afrikaner society. 
 
Ethnicity in South Africa 
Afrikanerdom:  Early Development of the Afrikaner Identity 
 
Many discussions of South African apartheid begin with the election of the 
Afrikaner National Party in 1948; however, to truly obtain a full understanding of the 
roots of the ethnic struggles and the implementation of the apartheid system, one must 
go back much further into the history of South Africa and the Afrikaner people 
(Hexam, 1980; Patterson, 1957).  European settler history in South Africa began in 
1652, with the establishment of a way station by the Dutch East India Company in the 




hierarchy with them to South Africa (Vestergaard, 2001). Originally, nine men from 
Dutch and German descent settled in the area in order to provide the ships en route to 
the East Indies with provisions (Patterson, 1957).  The early Cape inhabitants 
encountered the San and the Khoi Khoi, a pastoral people who became domestic 
servants to the settlers (Romero, 2004), and were also the ancestors of the segment of 
the population known as the Coloureds. According to Patterson (1957) these early 
settlers were not particularly hostile to the native populations; however, the arrival of 
French Huguenots in the year 1688 signaled the beginning of a more aggressive 
approach to frontier life in the Cape and beyond.  These settlers were very hard 
working farmers, or Boers as they came to be called, held a deeply rooted belief in 
Calvinism, and strongly rejected the values of Europe. Part of their reason for leaving 
Europe was to escape religious persecution and to enjoy the freedom of worshiping 
according to their own values.   
These settlers were a fiercely independent group with a strong desire for 
freedom to pursue their interests.  Eventually, they began to refer to themselves as 
Afrikaners instead of Europeans and developed their own language, known as 
Afrikaans, and they held a very distinct worldview with regard to the land and the 
native Africans and eventually came to be known as Boers, the Afrikaans word for 
farmer. (du Toit, 1983).  Stokes (1981: 68) identified the fundamentals of Afrikaner 
society which “constituted the lekker lewe (the good life)”:  Calvinism, the Afrikaans 
language, limited governmental authority, racial purity, white domination, and 
farming.  Thus, they arrived in South Africa with a deeply ingrained aversion to 




these circumstances, racial tolerance and assimilation were never possible.  There is 
some dispute as to what form of Calvinism influenced the Dutch Reformed Church 
and provided the Afrikaners with the religious justification for their treatment of the 
indigenous Africans (du Toit, 1983; Hexham, 1980); however, the core beliefs of the 
religious underpinning of apartheid are not in dispute (Stokes, 1975).  
According to Dubow (1992: 217) the Afrikaners believed God to be “the 
Great Divider” who separated not only earthly elements such as light from dark and 
day from night, but also separated people of different nations.  They viewed 
themselves as God’s chosen people with a divine mission to be a shining beacon of 
civilization in the Dark Continent, comparing their plight to that of the Israelites in 
the Old Testament. Indeed, the physical characteristics of the Africans were an 
integral part of the religion and ideology that eventually supported the racial system 
of apartheid.  As Patterson (1958:9) aptly notes, “…Christian society acquired a 
hierarchy of pigmentation” where equality between black and white would never be 
in Church or State.  Thus, the connection between the Afrikaner ethnic identity and 
race were established early on and became more important as the Afrikaners faced the 
British.   
The Influence of the British on Afrikaner Hegemony 
 
After the bankruptcy of the Dutch East India Company, the British moved into 
Southern Africa and established themselves as the main governing body of the Cape, 
taking over permanent control in 1806 (Stokes, 1975). The addition of indentured 




Southern Africa (Beinart and Dubow, 1995).  Despite the fact that the British were 
white, the Afrikaners saw themselves as separate from both the British and the 
indigenous Africans, demonstrating that for them, ethnic identity trumped racial 
identity (Dubow, 1992).  To the Afrikaners, the British government represented a 
corrupt institution that threatened the very freedom they had worked so hard to 
obtain.  The British did two main things that had a profound effect on the Boers of the 
Cape: they attempted to exert government authority over them and they began 
granting greater rights to the non-white population (Patterson, 1958).   
For example, Ordinance 50 of 1828 gave all non-white free persons the same 
legal status and economic freedom as whites and abolished slavery in 1834 
(Malherbe, 1997).  Rather than tolerate these changes, the Afrikaners embarked on 
the “Great Trek” (Omond, 1986), which took place between 1835 and early 1840’s 
(Patterson, 1957).  During this time, approximately 12,000 men, women and children 
packed up their belongings and moved further eastward into Southern Africa (Stokes, 
1975).  During the Trek, they encountered the Bantu peoples who were moving south 
in search of hunting grounds.  This resulted in numerous clashes between the two 
groups.  Eventually, the Afrikaners established the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal, also called the South Africa Republic, as two Boer Republics where they 
were free to farm the land and adhere to their religious, ethnic and racial principles of 
white purity (Meredith, 2007).  The British officially recognized these two Republics 
through the 1852 Sand River Convention and 1854 Bloemfontein Convention. 
For a time, the British tolerated the two independent Boer Republics; 




the British government attempted to annex their lands in order to create a 
confederation of states in South Africa in 1875.  Eventually, war broke out between 
the Boers and the British in 1880.  The Boers were successful in repelling the British 
forces and a tentative peace was established through the Pretoria Convention of 1881 
and the London Convention of 1884, which granted the Transvaal independence.  
Subsequently, as a protective strategy, the Transvaal government entered into an 
alliance with the Orange Free State government in 1897 (Meredith, 2007).  The 
discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 and diamonds in 1889 elevated the 
Afrikaner Republics from farming states to a more serious economic threat to the 
British. In 1899, the Second Boer War began between the two Republics and the 
British Army.  This time, the British successfully defeated the Boers and annexed the 
Orange Free State and the Transvaal in 1900, with the formal surrender occurring in 
1902 (Meredith, 2007).  
Legal, Social and Political Precursors to Apartheid in the Union of South 
Africa  
 
The Union of South Africa was subsequently established in 1910 (Khalfani 
and Zuberi, 2001) and consisted four colonies: Cape, Natal, Orange Free State, and 
Transvaal.  Many of the legal, social and political precursors to apartheid were 
codified in law after the establishment of the Union. As they moved in and through 
southern Africa, European settlers had expected the indigenous population to 
succumb to diseases, as had happened in other colonies (Dubow and Beinart, 1995).  
The native Africans, however, had already been exposed to many of the diseases and 




non-whites in Southern Africa always outnumbered the white population, which 
presented a major problem: how could they maintain superiority and white 
dominance while controlling the large population of Africans?  Part of the solution 
lay in the very nature of pre-colonial Southern African society (Beinart, 1995).  The 
existence of tribes and chiefdoms provided the South African government with a 
framework within which to create arrangements that they could use to exploit the 
labor pool and maintain control over the population: 
“‘The solution lie in the physical separation of the races in terms of living 
arrangements. The ideal…of allowing the white and black races each to 
develop their own natural lines, the policy pursued should aim steadily at the 
separation of the two races: into different areas…by a well-conceived set of 
laws’” (Legassick, 1972/3: 53). 
 
The South African government enacted the Native Land Act in 1913, a policy 
that led to the creation reserves to which thousands of Africans were relocated. 
According to Beinart (1995), the native Africans were moved to these areas, in part, 
to support the migrant labor force that worked in the diamond and gold mines. The 
exact role of the Africans in this system has been a source of dispute, with some 
arguing that the arrangements were forced on the population by the State (Wolpe, 
2003).  Without the cooperation of some members of the African population, 
especially the tribal leaders, the policies of the government would likely have been 
impossible to carry out. Beinart (1995) notes that tribal chiefs were compensated for 




“[c]hieftaincy may be seen as the final piece in this complex jigsaw of social control 
in that it provided the means for bolstering rural attachments and ethnic identities” 
(Beinart, 1995: 179).   
Additional legislation ensured the subjugation of the non-white population.  In 
1923, the government enacted the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which was another 
mechanism through which separate areas were designated for blacks and the access of 
blacks to white areas was restricted (Mitchell, 2008).  Furthermore, the South African 
government limited access to employment with the Mine and Works Act of Union 
Parliament of 1911 and the Colour Bar Act of 1926, both of which gave preferential 
treatment to whites for jobs (Frederickson, 1981). In the political arena, the native 
Africans faced total disenfranchisement save for the Cape Colony, where African, 
Asian and Coloured males could qualify to vote (Horrell, 1982) at the time the Union 
of South Africa was established.   Indeed, the peace treaty between the British and the 
Boers contained an important clause that prevented blacks from serving as member of 
the South African Parliament (Norval, 1990).  Dugard (1978) reports that by 1909 
only 5 percent of Africans and 10 percent of the Coloured population in the Cape 
were allowed to vote.  In 1959, all Africans were removed from the election rolls with 
the enactment of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, and Asian and 
Coloured men lost the right to vote in the Cape in 1970 (Horrell, 1982).  
Mobilization of the Afrikaner Ethnicity (1910-1948) 
 
After the establishment of the Union, the Afrikaners found themselves in a 




possibility of assimilation, which to them was abhorrent (see Mitchell, 2008). The 
language of the Empire was English, which meant that the Afrikaans speaking 
citizens were limited in employment and access to political power (O’Meara, 1977).  
As discussed above, the Afrikaner ethnic identity was linked to racial purity and 
cultural preservation, making the presence of non-whites a threat to the very existence 
of Afrikanerdom (Moodie, 1975).  Thus, “genetic mixing and cultural diffusion that 
were seen as the natural concomitant of intergroup contact would erode unity and 
identity among the volk, thus undermining its God-given mission” (Price, 1991: 14).   
The mobilization of the Afrikaner identity began as a movement to restore the 
pride and dignity of the Afrikaner population in the wake of the devastating defeats of 
the Boer Wars (Omond, 1986).  Other contributing factors included the rapid 
industrialization and attendant decline in rural farming, which forced poor Afrikaners 
to seek employment in urban areas (Vestergaard, 2001).  In response to these 
challenges and crises, Afrikaners began to organize themselves (Knecht, 2008). A 
small group of Afrikaans speaking men formed the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1918.  
The Broederbond was a secret society meant to influence the inner workings of the 
South African government in favor of the Afrikaner population (O’Meara, 1977). The 
Constitution of the Broederbond is infused with the rhetoric of ethnicity: 
“Built on ‘a Christian-national foundation’ with its motto ‘Be strong’, the 
Bond’s constitutional aims were three-fold: ‘to effect an healthy and 
progressive unity between all Afrikaners who strive for the welfare of the 
Afrikaner nation; the stimulation of Afrikaner national consciousness and the 




and the promotion of all the interests of the Afrikaner nation’.” (O’Meara, 
1977: 165). 
 
The importance of the Broederbond cannot be understated, as many of the apartheid-
era prime ministers and the majority of cabinet members since 1948 have belonged to 
the organization (O’Meara, 1977).  This secret society played an instrumental role in 
securing the election for the National Party by mediating with other Afrikaner 
political parties, by elucidating the apartheid ideology, by promoting the cultural and 
language traditions of the Afrikaner volk, and perhaps, most importantly, by 
propagating fear of the black population as an economic threat.  The phrase “ ‘swart 
gevaar’ ” or ‘black danger’ became an effective election slogan for the National Party 
(Knecht, 2008: 54).  
The Apartheid Apparatus  
After the 1948 election and the success of the Afrikaners, apartheid began to 
take shape within South Africa.  The term apartheid literally means ‘apart-ness’ 
(Omond, 1986:11) and the program of apartheid was presented by the National Party 
as a means to allow for the separate development of the different ethnic groups in the 
country by respecting cultural, religious, and language traditions.  Others of course, 
ascribe a more sinister motive for the development of the apartheid state.  Mitchell 
(2008:52) notes that “[s]eperate development was in essence to get the country out of 
interracial mixing, by allocating the different races to territorial distinctiveness…”  
To that end, the white South African government consolidated its power by passing a 




(Omond, 1986).  These Bantustans were designated homelands for blacks and a 
program of forced relocation was undertaken in order to move millions of blacks to 
these areas (Beck, 2000).  Ethnic identities were assigned to each Bantustan, based on 
the idea that the ethnic groups would develop according to their own capacities and 
eventually become independent political bodies (Mitchell, 2008).  Racial 
categorization served as an important identifier for ethnicity and reinforced the 
Afrikaner ideal of racial purity. 
The goal of the apartheid system in general and the segregation laws in 
particular was the complete and total separation of the races (Price, 1991).  
Segregation laws were an attempt to solve two ongoing major problems facing the 
apartheid government.  First, the white population was a numerical minority, 
representing only 7% of the population, which put it at a significant risk of loss of 
power.  Second, the two groups were economically interdependent: the continuing 
reliance on non-whites for a cheap supply of labor and the non-whites relied on the 
white population for access to much needed work (Beck, 2000).  
Other laws included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), the 
Group Areas Act (1950), and the Population Registration Act (1950) (Omond, 1985).  
The Mixed Marriages Act prohibited interracial marriages; the Group Areas Act 
allowed the government to move inhabitants to new locations based on their race, and 
the Population Registration Act required each person to be classified by race on a 
national registry.  The government established a Race Classification Board in order to 
determine the race of individuals in borderline cases (Beck, 2000).  Anyone unable to 




Separate Amenities Act of 1953 legalized segregation in South Africa (Beck, 2000).  
Many of the laws passed during the next two decades were designed to repress dissent 
among the population and to enforce the apartheid system.  
Promoting Ethnicity within the Bantustans 
 The Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 established 10 homelands, which are 
listed in Table 1, and was based on the Native Land Act of 1913 (Mitchell, 2008).  
Ethnicity served as the foundation for the homeland system and each had its own 
governing body with chief ministers, legislatures, and cabinets.  By creating 
ethnically based homelands, the apartheid government rejected the idea that South 
Africa was a multiracial and ethnic society and that the native Africans were entitled 
to any rights or privileges from the South African government (Zegeye, 2001).  In this 
way, the apartheid government was “able to use the very deprivation and 
dispossession which it imposed on the Africans to ‘reinvent’ ethnic differences” 
(Szeftel, 1994: 193).  Table 1 lists the bantustans with the ethnicity attached to each 
homeland.  In total, these areas consisted of 13% of the land in South Africa, yet were 

















Table 1: List of Bantustan Homelands and Ethnic Affiliation 
 
 
Homeland     Ethnicity 
 
Transkei     Xhosa 
Bophuthatswana    Tswana 
Venda      Venda 
Ciskei      Xhosa 
Gazankulu     Tsonga  
KaNgwane     Swazi 
KwaNdebele     Ndebele 
KwaZulu     Zulu 
Lebowa     Northern Sotho or Pedi 
QwaQwa     Southern Sotho 
 
The Zulu Ethnic Identity 
Although there were numerous ethnic identities within the black African 
population, the Zulus stand out as a group that was able to mobilize ethnic identity 
during apartheid era South Africa (Mitchell, 2008; Szeftel, 1994).  The history of the 
Zulu kingdom played an important role for both the apartheid government and the 
leaders of the KwaZulu Bantustan.  According to Deflem (1999), Zulu Kingdom 
history starts in the early 19
th
 century, with the rule of Dingiswayo, the Chief of a 
Nguni-speaking Bantu group named Mthethwa located in southeastern Africa. During 
Dingiswayo’s reign, which lasted from 1808 to 1818, he consolidated a number of 
surrounding chiefdoms in order to end the constant warfare among them.  His main 
contribution was the restructuring of the military, which he transformed from a 
kinship organization to an age-based one with less reliance on lineage.  Among the 
conquered chiefdoms were the Zulus, whose leader, Shaka, eventually reorganized 




death of Dingisway in 1818, Shaka murdered his heir, gained control of the Mthethwa 
forces and integrated them within the Zulu regiments.  Shaka subsequently declared 
himself to be the ruler of the Zulu Kingdom. Shaka used brutality and terror to 
expand his influence and bring the other chiefdoms under his control until his 
assassination in 1828.  
The British and the Boers had intermittent contact with the Zulu Kingdom 
during this time; however, the might of the Zulu army served as a deterrent for 
invasion until the late 19
th
 century (Deflem, 1999). A number of successors to Shaka 
ruled the Zulu Kingdom until the 1873, when the British crowned Cetshwayo, the 
heir of Mpande who had ruled the Kingdom for thirty years.  This coronation, 
however, was a mere formality, as the British attempted to force Cetshwayo to 
demilitarize, allow missionaries to preach to the population, and to stop the practice 
of execution.  The Zulu king refused to meet the demands of the British, which 
resulted in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, and by 1897, the once mighty Zulu Kingdom 
had become a protectorate of the British and eventually a part of Natal (Deflem, 
1999).   
The apartheid government used the history of the Zulus and other groups to 
legitimate the segregationist policies.  The Zulus, however, were able to co-opt and 
mobilize the identity for political purposes.  The establishment of Inkatha as a cultural 
organization in 1922 marked the beginning of the process of political mobilization 
(Mitchell, 2008).  The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) emerged in 1975 as a political 
organization for the Zulu people and initially worked with the African National 




leader of IFP had previously been a member of the ANC; however, sought to 
maintain the primacy of ethnicity in South Africa and split with the ANC in 1979 
(Adam, 1995).  A bitter rivalry developed between the two groups as they fought for 
control of the Zulu homeland.  The Chief and members of IFP sought to maintain the 
primacy of ethnic identity during the transition to democracy, putting them at odds 
with the ANC. 
The African National Congress and Opposition to Apartheid  
 
            One of the most recognizable groups to emerge in South Africa was the 
African National Congress (ANC), which began as the South African Native National 
Congress in 1912 (Norval, 1990).  The ANC began as a non-violent social movement 
that protested the apartheid system with passive resistance methods and civil 
disobedience.  In 1960, during a protest against the pass laws poliices the police 
opened fire on a crowd of people, killing 69 (Beck, 2000).  This incident became 
known as the Sharpeville Massacre, and shortly after it occurred, the government 
officially banned resistance organizations such as the African National Congress and 
the Pan-Africanist Congress.  A state of emergency was also declared, during which 
thousands of people were arrested and detained (Zune, 1999). As a result of the 
massacre, the ANC created an armed wing known as Umkhonto we Sizwe  (The Spear 
of the Nation) during the 1960’s and began to engage in acts of political violence 
against the South African government (Norval, 1990).   
   The government acted swiftly and imprisoned or exiled the ANC leadership, 




was from the Xhosa tribe (Mandela, 1995).  Mandela and his colleagues’ trial began 
on October 9, 1963 and ended on June 11, 1964 when they were sentenced to life 
imprisonment for organizing resistance to the government.  The arrest, imprisonment 
and exile of resistance leaders ended the initial phase of violent resistance.  It was not 
until the 1970’s and 1980’s that there was a re-emergence of violent actions in protest 
of apartheid.  The ANC completely rejected the notion of a government based on 
ethnic or racial identity (Adam, 1995).  Instead, they advocated for a nation based on 
individual rights regardless of origin or identity.  
  
Summary and Overview of the Forthcoming Chapters 
 
In this Chapter, I introduced the theoretical basis of my dissertation and 
provided an overview of the historical context within which I conduct my analyses.  
This historical overview is necessary in order to demonstrate the importance of 
ethnicity in South Africa.   
In Chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical concepts that form the basis of my 
arguments.  Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on the theories of intergroup and 
interethnic conflict.  In Chapter 4, I present the current focus of the study and explain 
my hypotheses and make predictions.  In Chapter 5, I present the data and the 
methodology that I utilize in order to test my hypotheses.  Chapter 6 contains the 
results of my analyses.  Finally, in Chapter 7, I provide a discussion of the results and 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Conceptualizations 
 
Overview 
In this Chapter, I review the theoretical concepts that provide the foundation 
for the present study.  First, I discuss the concept of terrorism and describe the 
relationship between ethnicity and terrorism. I then review concepts from the 
literature on intergroup and interethnic conflict.  Finally, I provide a discussion of 
ethnic conflict in South Africa. 
The Concept of Terrorism 
When it comes to terrorism, there is no standard definition.  For example, 
Schmid (2005) pointed out that even within United States, government agencies, until 
recently, had no consensus on defining terrorism. For example, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (1999) has defined terrorism as “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of 
force or violence by a group or individual … committed against persons or property 
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, 
in furtherance of political or social objective.” The US Department of Defense (2000) 
has defined terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to 
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the 
pursuit of goals are generally political, religious or ideological.” Finally, the US State 
Department (1984) has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 




The data that I analyze are from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which 
was created by the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorist (START) located at the University of Maryland (UMD). Early GTD data 
were collected by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS), a private company 
that provided risk information to businesses by gathering detailed event level 
information on terrorist incidents from a number of sources, including wire services, 
newspapers, and U.S. State Department reports (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).  PGIS 
used the U.S. military definition of terrorism: “[t]he threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through 
fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). This definition is 
relatively inclusive and was applied to all data included in this analysis. The GTD 
will be described more fully in the Data and Methodology section below. 
A critical question that inevitably arises in this research is whether the 
violence in South Africa was terrorism or a liberation struggle.  Because I am 
examining political violence within a specific historical context – the apartheid era in 
South Africa - it is appropriate to define much of the violence during this time frame 
as terrorist violence.  Furthermore, the African National Congress (ANC) was 
designated a terrorist organization by the South African government and the United 
State government during the 1970’s and 1980’s (Hall, 2008).  In fact, Nelson 
Mandela, the former president of South Africa, and other high profile members of the 
ANC remained on the United States Terrorist Watchlist until June 2008 when 
President Bush signed a bill removing them (Barnes, 2008).   During the time frame 




violence fit the definition I am using because they were non-state actors using 
violence to attain political, economic and social goals.  Finally, the broad definition of 
the GTD allows me to examine the violence in South Africa regardless of whether it 
is considered to be terrorism or a liberation struggle. 
 
Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism  
Ethnicity and Conflict 
Put in simple terms, ethnicity refers to ‘the characterization or quality of an 
ethnic group’ (Mann, 1983:114).  One of the primary characteristics of ethnic groups 
is the presence of exclusion.  In other words, ethnic groups justify their existence, in 
part, through purposeful exclusion and social comparison (Mare, 1993).  This is not 
necessarily a negative characteristic and can have many positive functions in terms of 
fostering group solidarity.  Indeed, ethnicity is not in itself a political construct; 
however, because ethnicity is by definition an exclusionary construct, it is vulnerable 
to manipulation and politicization that can result in violence by and against ethnic 
groups.   
 According to Fearon (2004:2) “[e]thnicity is politicized when political 
coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic 
benefits depends on ethnicity.”  Race may become an important feature when it is 
connected to ethnicity, as was the case in South Africa.  In addition to access to 
political and economic resources, territory is another resource that can contribute to 
the politicization of ethnicity.  Mare (1993) states that territory can stimulate ethno-




identity or by establishing the actual physical or geographical boundaries of ethnic 
groups.  Territory that has been the subject of dispute between rival ethnic groups can 
bridge these two aspects, particularly “when a mythology of space, of holy territory, 
of the land on which and for which blood has been spilt, strengthen claims for a 
physically bounded area” (Mare, 1993: 44).   
The role of ethnicity in generating conflict in contemporary societies has been 
a source of debate within the social sciences. According to Horowitz (1985; 2000), 
many ongoing conflicts in the world are driven by ethnic struggles.  Bergmann and 
Crutchfield (2009) argue that ethnic conflicts are a persistent feature of many 
contemporary societies, most of which have heterogeneous populations that compete 
for resources. Fearon (2004) suggests that violence associated with ethnicity can 
trigger extreme and swift polarization along ethnic lines even in societies where 
ethnicity previously had not been politicized.  
On the other hand, Mueller (2000:43) contends that ethnically based conflict 
has been largely exaggerated and is as “banal” as other forms of violence.  Indeed, he 
questions the very concept of ‘ethnic warfare’, stating that “…insofar as it is taken to 
imply a war of all against all and neighbor against neighbor…ethnic war essentially 
does not exist” (Mueller, 2000:42-43). Similarly, Gilley (2004) maintains that the 
theoretical and empirical evidence of ethnic conflict is weak and warns against its use 
in the field of conflict studies.  The surge in conflict after dissolution of the Soviet 
Union during the 1990s in former Eastern Bloc countries has prompted researchers to 
argue that long held animosities by opposing ethnic groups ignited a firestorm of 




Bosnia and Rwanda, Mueller (2000) concluded that ethnicity played only a minor 
role in those conflicts.  He attributes the violence to political elites who worked to 
mobilize and recruit relatively small groups of criminals and gangs who carried out 
the violence.   
Byman (1998) argues that ethnic conflicts often result in the rise of terrorist 
violence between groups struggling for power, particularly as nations transition to 
democratic societies. Stepanova (2008) contends that the majority of nationalist 
struggles do not involve all-encompassing violence; rather, these types of conflicts 
involve only a small portion of the population.  Her line of reasoning is similar to that 
of Mueller (2000) in that the focus is on smaller groups of individuals who are 
mobilized.  Rather than focusing on large-scale societal conflict, I focus on a specific 
form of violence – ethnically-justified terrorism.  This is in line with Mueller (2000), 
in the sense that I focus on violence perpetrated by ethnically affiliated groups rather 
than large-scale interethnic conflict.  
Ethnicity and Terrorism 
Ethnic terrorism, also referred to as ethno-nationalism or separatism, has been 
the subject of study for decades. Lefebvre (2003) notes that ethnic terrorism came to 
prominence in the 1960s and 70s as a tactic used by ethno-nationalist groups during 
the colonial and post-colonial eras.  She argues that groups such as the Irgun in Israel 
and the Front de liberation nationale (FLN) in Algeria embarked on violent 
campaigns to bring attention to their causes and that by 1978, the number of ethnic 
terrorist groups rose from 3 to 30 (LeFebvre, 2003).  Ethnic terrorism can 




calling into question its legitimacy (Pokalova, 2010).   Byman’s (1998: 151) 
definition of ethnic terrorism encapsulates the characteristics of this type of violence: 
Ethnic terrorism can be defined as deliberate violence by a subnational 
group to advance its cause.  Such violence usually focuses either on 
the creation of a separate state or on the elevation of the status of one 
communal group over others.  Designed to foster identity as well as to 
advance standard political goals, ethnic terrorism is often directed 
against symbolic targets.  Unlike other terrorists, ethnic terrorists often 
have a built-in audience among their own communal groups.   
 
These features of ethnic terrorism make it particularly difficult to deal with.    
In fact, Byman (1998) argues that ethnic terrorism is separate and distinct 
from other forms of terrorism because ethnic terrorists use violence not only to create 
fear, but also to enhance mutual bonds within their specific community and to garner 
support from the wider community.  This is troubling because acts of terror may 
become a source of ethnic pride, regardless of whether they succeed or fail and ethnic 
terrorists have access to an audience with which it has much in common through a 
shared history.  Additionally, ethnic terrorist acts may be viewed as acts of rebellion 
against a repressive government rather than as random acts of violence, providing 
some semblance of legitimacy to terrorist acts.  The refusal to assimilate or become 





The goals of ethnic terrorists are purportedly different from those of other 
types of terrorists such as those mobilized around leftist or religious causes (Byman, 
1998).  Ethnic terrorists basically focus on the needs of their particular group, rather 
than the interests of the entire population.  Additionally, membership in the ethnic 
group is often limited to those individuals who share similar traits, history 
characteristics, customs, language, etc., unlike a religious group where membership is 
based on a system of beliefs.  Byman (1998) further argues that one of the mistakes 
that governments make in dealing with ethnic terrorists is ignoring motives and solely 
focusing on the targets or audience of terrorist attacks.  Ethnic terrorist motives can 
vary considerably from the desire for a new regime, to the quest for a separate state or 
simply recognition of the existence of a particular ethnic group.   
Countering ethnic terrorism presents a major challenge to governments 
(Strmiska, 2001).  Indeed, retaliation by the government against ethnic terrorists may 
lead to radicalization on the part of members of the ethnic group.  This is particularly 
true when governments respond in a heavy-handed manner to more moderate groups 
in the rival ethnic community. This can have a two-pronged effect.  It may motivate 
members of the moderate group to become violent and it can cut off potential allies in 
the fight against terrorism.  DeVotta (2009) uses the case of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to demonstrate the deleterious effects of counterterrorism 
strategies can have on a nation.  In the case of majority Sinhalese led Sri Lanka, their 
forceful tactics led to the defeat of LTTE; however, the result suppression of 
individual rights and freedoms and the development of a militarized style 




government fighting separatist terrorism.  As Byman (1998) notes, moderate groups 
can be a source of intelligence on more radical or violent groups and alliances with 
these moderate groups can encourage them to engage in policing the behavior of 
extremist groups.  Additionally, holding elections and engaging in power sharing 
agreements with moderate groups may also be an effective counterterrorism strategy.   
Theories of Intergroup Conflict 
Overview 
Political scientists have extensively elaborated on the relationship between 
grievances and terrorism, much more so than criminologists.  Gurr’s (1968; 1970) 
work on relative deprivation essentially set the stage for developing the current 
understanding of the impact of grievances on violence.  In this case, grievances are 
conceptualized in terms of economic disparity.  According to Gurr (1970), value 
expectations represent the essential goods and conditions of life to which people feel 
they are rightly entitled.  Value capabilities represent their assessment of what they 
actually possess.  If people evaluate their value expectation and capabilities and 
conclude that there is a discrepancy, they may react with discontent or frustration 
based on a perception of relative deprivation.  Thus, the perception of a discrepancy 
induces anger and increases the likelihood of an aggressive response.   
Other models of political violence that include grievances have been 
articulated.  For example, Ross (1993) proposed a causal model of political terrorism 
with grievances as an important variable.  Borrowing from Crenshaw (1981), he 
argued that grievances result from coercion, oppression, discrimination, or repression 




identified seven categories into which grievances could be divided:  political, ethnic, 
social, religious, racial, economic and legal.   Grievances that fester can lead to 
collective action, including terrorism and political violence.  Ross (1993) predicts that 
the greater the number of grievances, the greater the amount of terrorism. 
Gurr and Moore (1997) proposed a model of ethnopolitical conflict in which 
they identify four main concepts: rebellion, repression, mobilization, and grievances.  
Rebellion involves the use of violent actions taken by ethnic organizations on behalf 
of the ethnic population.  Repression consists of the actions take by the state against 
the ethnic group.  Mobilization refers to the ability of an ethnic group to obtain and 
maintakn support for collective action.  Grievances are defined as “widely shared 
dissatisfaction among group members about their cultural, political, and/or economic 
standing vis a vis dominant groups” (Gurr and Moore,1997:1081).   
 Studies and research in criminology also provide a foundation for 
understanding the nature and dynamics of inter-group conflict.  Much of the previous 
work has focused on race relations within the United States.  Because the apartheid 
system was built upon the ideal of racial dominance, which supported the Afrikaner 
ethnic identity and concern with the preservation of white purity, it is appropriate to 
look at these studies to contextualize the conflict in South Africa. 
Power Threat Hypothesis 
Blalock (1967) articulated a theory of intergroup relations that is largely based 
on power distribution and focuses on the relationship between blacks and whites in 
the United States and forms the foundation for contemporary studies of interracial 




conflict by suppressing minority groups that attempt or are perceived to attempt to 
increase their share of power.  In applying power threat theory in the United States, 
Blalock focused on race and argued that as the size of the black population increases, 
whites perceive this as a threat to their economic and political power and respond by 
engaging in discrimination in order to maintain dominant status.  Thus, there are two 
dimensions to threat theory: the economy and the polity. 
Competition between whites and blacks for economic resources such as jobs 
may increase discrimination and generate intergroup conflict (D’Alessio et al., 2002; 
Blalock, 1967).  In this case, structural changes may result in direct competition for 
employment between the two races that can trigger a perception by whites that blacks 
will replace them in the labor market (Jacobs and Wood, 1999).  For example, in the 
pre-civil rights United States, blacks were treated as second-class citizens, and had 
unequal status under the law.  With the passage and enforcement of civil rights 
legislation, blacks have been better able to obtain access to the skills and education 
necessary to compete with whites in the labor market (Farley, 1984).  Because there 
are a finite number of jobs, and blacks are able to compete for and possibly obtain 
those jobs, some whites will ultimately lose out in the job market (Jacobs and Wood, 
1999).  Hence, whites facing the threat of economic loss may be motivated to commit 
acts of discrimination to maintain their position. 
In terms of the political structure, Blalock (1967), proposed a relationship 
between discrimination and black political mobilization.  Specifically, individual and 
institutionalized acts of discrimination by whites against blacks increase and attempts 




continues until the black population numerically surpasses the white population, 
thereby becoming the majority; however, it is not enough to simply be a majority. 
Blacks must also effectively engage in political mobilization.  This means that if the 
black population is unable to mobilize or utilize resources effectively, it will not be 
capable of challenging the status quo.  Thus, it may be the case that even where the 
black population represents a numerical majority, as in South Africa, it may 
nonetheless remain in a subordinate position (Blalock, 1967).   Presumably, when 
blacks have accrued sufficient political power, white elites will seek to accommodate 
to their demands (Stolzenberg, D’Alessio and Eitle, 2004).   Indeed, Wilson (1987) 
argues that there has been a shift in the struggle among racial groups in the United 
States, away from economic inequality to the political sphere, particularly at the local 
or municipal level and suggests that class-based conflict may be replacing race-based 
conflicts (Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Parker and McCall, 1999; King and Brustein, 
2006).    
 
Process Model for Anticipating Ethnic Conflict 
Figure 1 depicts the process model for anticipating ethnic conflict, which was 
developed by researchers at RAND (Tellis, Szanya and Winnefeld, 1997:1).  The 
model is useful for understanding the occurrence of ethnic conflict.  The starting point 
is the belief that ethnicity is a social construct that can be used for the purposes of 
collective action and mobilization.  Three questions provide the conceptual 
framework for the model: 1) What is the potential for societal strife; 2) What is 




likely strife eventually disintegrate into actual strife? (Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld, 
1997).  Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the conceptual model.  In 
terms of evaluating the potential for social strife, one must examine closure in the 
political, social and economic spheres, and then understand the basis of closure.  This 
entails identifying the lines along which access to resources is determined within the 
social, economic and political sectors of a particular society.    
 
Figure 1: Process Model for Anticipating Ethnic Conflict
 
 
Closure, in the Weberian tradition, refers to “the process of subordination 
whereby one group monopolizes advantages by closing off opportunities to another 
group” (Murphy, 1988:8). Ascertaining which groups are among the privileged and 
which groups are most deprived can provide important insight into to the potential of 
these groups to engage in conflict (Marsh and Szayna, 2000). Another aspect of 




structures within society.  Greater access allows groups to engage in non-violent 
forms of protest and allows governments the option of exercising nonviolent means to 
make policy changes.  
Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld, (1997) point out that the likelihood or potential 
for violent conflict does not mean that conflict will occur. In order for the actual  
violence to occur, there needs to be a catalyst, a proposition that is in contrast to 
relative deprivation arguments, which predict that revolutions are the result of 
spontaneous action on the part of the oppressed masses (Gurr, 1968; Davies, 1962). 
There are five types of catalysts that may lead to mobilization of ethnic groups, 
shifting potential strife to likely strife.  As Figure 1 demonstrates, these catalysts are 
change in the balance of power, ‘tipping events’, identify entrepreneurs, resources 
and organization, and external assistance (Tellis, Szayna and Winnefeld, 1997:42-52).  
Tipping events are very public occurrences that can solidify and reinforce 
group identity, such as forcing the relocation of a group or an incident of mass 
violence against a particular group. The concept of identity entrepreneurs refers to 
individuals who become leaders of a group and serve as instigators of mobilization.  
They provide the leadership necessary to organize resistance.  Resources and 
organization are tied into the work of identity entrepreneurs.  Resources are necessary 
in order to enable members of the group to carry out activities to further their cause 
and leadership is required to maintain structure.   Finally, access to foreign support is 
an important catalyst for transforming potential strife.  A group that may attain 




Dramatic changes in power structure of a society can set the stage for likely 
strife and the more immediate these changes are, the greater the risk of conflict.  
Additionally, if the changes threaten the balance of power in favor of oppressed 
groups, this can serve as a motivator and increase expectations on the part of these 
groups.  The privileged groups facing the loss of power may also mobilize; however, 
there is some evidence which suggests that groups facing the imminent loss of power 
may be more likely to accept changes and engage in accommodation in order to avoid 
greater losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).   
The next step is to assess the capability of the State to prevent conflict and this 
involves understanding its accommodative capacity, fiscal, capability and coercive 
capability.  The accommodative capability refers to the inclusiveness and 
responsiveness of the state to address grievances of the general population.  In other 
words, one must examine how much access groups have to the political structure in 
order make changes in the government.  Fiscal capability refers to the financial health 
of a state in terms of economic growth.  Finally, coercive capability refers to the 
ability of the state to utilize military and police resources to suppress opposition 
groups and the willingness of the state to actually use these resources.  As Figure 1 
demonstrates, the political outcomes range from settlement to state breakdown.  
Strategic bargaining may forestall conflict if the government is in a position to 
maintain control of the mobilized ethnic groups or is willing to negotiate a political 





In this Chapter, I identified the definition of terrorism that guides the present 
research.  I also discussed the concept of ethnic terrorism, which is the category of 
terrorism that I am examining.  I reviewed the theoretical concepts that will be 
applied below to the South African case.  In the next chapter, I review the relevant 










 In this Chapter, I provide a review of the literature on intergroup and 
interethnic conflict.  First, I review studies of Blalock’s power threat hypothesis and 
conclude with studies on the application of the process model for anticipating ethnic 
conflict.  Much of the research on intergroup violence has focused on race relations in 
the United States, and is relevant to the study of conflict in South Africa.  Although 
the apartheid system was developed to protect the Afrikaner ethnic identity, it was 
race and a codified system of racial classification that served as the main tool used to 
determine access to rights, privileges and resources.  
 
Empirical tests of power threat theory 
 
Earlier studies of intergroup violence from the power threat perspective 
focused on the study of lynchings (Beck and Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990; Phillips, 
1986) and race riots (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney, 1996). These studies focus 
on the relationship between two concepts: minority percentage and acts of 
discrimination. The prediction is that as minority percentage rises, acts of 
discrimination against the minority group should increase (Blalock, 1956). As 
previously stated, Blalock identified two dimensions of power threat: economic and 
political.  These two types of threats were hard to disentangle because they tend to 
occur together, making it difficult to test the power threat hypotheses.  Blalock (1967) 




political rather than economic threats.  These types of discriminatory acts include 
restricting the political rights of the subordinate group, using segregation, and holding 
a threat-oriented ideology (Blalock, 1967: 159).  These types of acts were present in 
both the United States before the civil rights movement and in South Africa during 
apartheid.  
Based on Blalock’s theoretical conceptualization, Tolnay, Beck, and Masesy 
(1989: 607) identified a fourth form of discrimination in Blalock’s work: ritualistic or 
symbolic types of violence such as lynching.  According to this modification of 
Blalock’s theory, locations where blacks represent a large proportion of the 
population should have a higher frequency of lynchings.  Several studies have been 
conducted study the impact of lynching as a tactic to subdue minority threat.  
Lynching, by its sheer brutality and public nature, became a mechanism of social 
control used to maintain white domination, particularly in the southern United States.  
According to the NAACP, 3,290 people were lynched between 1889 and 1931 and 
85% of those victims were black (Tolnay, Beck and Massey, 1989; NAACP, 1919, 
1929-32).  Although Blalock (1967) declined to include an analysis of lynching in his 
work due to an inability to find an adequate methodology or appropriate data, other 
researchers have worked to identify variables and methods that could be used to 
examine Blalock’s predictions with regard to lyncings.  Reed (1972) calculated a 
lynching rate for counties in the state of Mississippi from 1889-1930.  His findings 
confirmed Blalock’s prediction of a positive relationship between percent black and 
lynching.  Indeed, counties with greater than an 80% black population had 




Building on earlier work, Corzine, Creech and Corzine (1983) examined 
lynching throughout the South between 1889 and 1931.  Their research included 
controls for a number of socioeconomic variables and was conducted at two levels.  
Specifically, they examined their hypotheses on data for all southern US states and 
then examined a separate analysis of the deep south and the upper south.  They found 
a positive relationship between minority percentage and discrimination in the 
southern states and the deep south states, but found no relationship in the upper 
southern states.  Tolnay, Beck and Massey (1989) questioned the results of Reed 
(1972) and Corzine, Creech and Corzine (1983), as well as the validity of the power 
threat hypothesis.  They identified a number of methodological issues, including 
problems with the lynching index, the use of outliers and the truncation of part of the 
sample.  In their reanalysis of the data, Tolnay, Beck and Massey (1989) determined 
that the results did not support the power threat hypothesis.  More recent research has 
focused on other forms of intergroup violence, such as hate crimes and interracial 
robberies and homicides.   
 
Empirical Tests of Intergroup Violence 
Race and intergroup violence 
Green, Strolovitch and Wong (1998) examined racially based hate crimes in 
New York City.  They found an association between the proportion of minorities in a 
community and reports of hate crimes specifically in historically white 
neighborhoods.  Within integrated neighborhoods, reported hate crimes decreased as 




any association between economic indicators of power threat and hate crimes.  Jacobs 
and Wood (1999) examined the influence of economic and political conflict on 
interracial homicides at the city level.  They generated hypotheses from three 
perspectives, including Blalock’s power threat hypothesis.  Sepcifically, they 
proposed that conflict and competition would occur within two spheres – the 
economy and the polity.  In terms of economic competition, they predicted that in 
cities where there is more competition between blacks and whites for jobs, there will 
be more interracial homicides.  They included measures of black and white 
unemployment rates in order to generate interracial competition variables and 
measures of total unemployment.  For political competition, the authors predicted that 
cities with a black mayor would have higher rates of whites killing blacks, but lower 
rates of blacks killing whites.  They reason that in cases where blacks attain enough 
political capital to elect a black mayor, this will result in blacks feeling more 
empowered.  Whites, on the other hand, will feel a loss of power and react through 
increased violence against blacks.   
The results indicated that increases in economic competition between blacks 
and whites led to increased interracial homicides.  Specifically, whites were more 
likely to kill blacks in cities with greater economic competition.  In terms of political 
competition, they found that whites were more likely to kill blacks in cities with a 
black mayor.  Additionally, there were fewer killings of whites by blacks in cities 
with a black mayor.  The findings suggest that in cities with a black mayor, whites are 




that is was important to consider the impact of political and economic competition on 
interracial killings.   
Parker and McCall (1999) studied the impact of structural characteristics on 
black and white homicide rates.  They examined whether economic deprivation, job 
accessibility and racial inequality were related to black and white victim and offender 
rates of homicide.  They also looked at whether structural conditions had an impact 
on inter- and intraracial patterns of homicide within neighborhoods.  Thus, the 
authors rely on race relations research to supplement traditional structural theories 
that attempt to explain inter and intraracial crime rates.  In order to provide context 
for their arguments, Parker and McCall discuss the structural changes that have taken 
place in the United States in terms of labor market opportunities.  Relying on Wilson 
(1987), the authors note that changes in the economic sector have resulted in the loss 
of many manufacturing jobs in minority communities, increasing poverty levels and 
resulting in isolation from additional economic opportunities.   
They begin their theoretical discussion with a review of strain and relative 
deprivation theories, which posit that crime is but one reaction to the feelings of 
injustice generated by blocked or limited opportunities.  Because minorities are more 
likely to exist in the lower class strata of society, they are expected to have a higher 
potential for experiencing relative deprivation, which may result in violence.  They 
point out that previous research on inequality and homicide has demonstrated no 
relationship between inequality and black homicide rates, but that there is a positive 
effect on white homicide rates, which is contrary to the expected results.  The authors 




between groups.  The first is job accessibility.  The impact of labor market changes 
have effects on both whites and blacks and may generate strain and conflict within 
these groups as competition for jobs increases.  Between-group competition can result 
as more whites strive for low-skilled jobs, which were traditionally held by blacks.  
As competition grows, blacks become increasingly viewed or perceived as a threat to 
whites, thereby increasing their hostility toward blacks and the potential for white 
interracial violence. 
They also reviewed another structural theory, social disorganization theory.  
Social disorganization theorists argue that certain features compromise the ability of 
communities to maintain social order (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Bursik, 1988).  In the 
United States, many urban areas exhibit high levels of poverty, ethnic heterogenity 
and residential mobility—all characteristics of social disorganization.  Parker and 
McCall identify racial segregation as being related to social disorganization theory 
because it reflects increasing disparities between blacks and whites, as well as the 
intolerance of whites to living with or near blacks.  Increased racial segregation 
decreases opportunities for blacks and whites to associate, which limits black 
interracial homicides against whites.  However, because of the nature of racial 
segregation, there will be greater rates of black intraracial homicides. 
In order to test their hypotheses, they used data on US cities that had a 
population of over 100,000 in 1990 as well as data from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports and Comparative Homicide Files from the 
Supplementary Homicide Reports.  They found that economic deprivation had a 




killings.  Economic deprivation also had a significant effect on both white inter- and 
intraracial homicides.  For local opportunity structure, they found that job 
accessibility decreased black rates of intraracial homicide, but increased black 
interracial killings.  For whites, as the job opportunity structure weakened, there was 
an increase in white inter and intraracial killings.  Racial inequality was found to 
increase black intraracial killings but did not affect the other categories of homicide.  
The authors conclude that race relations literature is indeed complementary to 
criminological structural theories when examining inter and intra group violence.  
They also demonstrated the importance of considering the role of residential 
segregation in levels of violence.   
Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D’Alessio (2002) assessed the impact of black 
economic and political threats on violent inter and intraracial crimes.  They point out 
that previous research on interracial violence has focused on relatively rare events 
such as lynchings and hate crimes and that the data used to test hypotheses has been 
dated or inadequate.  In order to correct these deficiencies, they utilized county level 
National Incident-Based Reporting System data from the state of South Carolina, 
which allowed them to capture race specific information for each offense.  They also 
built upon previous work by examining a wider range of offenses, including assault, 
rape and robberies.   
Similar to the previous studies, the authors predicted black political 
mobilization would increase white on black crime and decrease black on white crime.  
Similarly they predicted that increased economic conditions would increase white on 




association between economic competition and white on black crime.  The other 
hypotheses were not supported, which the authors interpreted as calling into question 
the predictive ability of power threat theory for explaining inter and intraracial crime.   
McCall and Parker (2005) pointed out that many studies of homicide are cross 
sectional, which fails to account for the potentially dynamic impact of deprivation on 
racially disaggregated homicide rates.  They corrected this deficiency by applying a 
longitudinal design to the study of interracial homicide, which allowed them to 
consider macro level economic and social changes over time between 1980 and 1990.  
The authors hypothesized that, as the black population increased, so would the 
probability of white interracial killings.  They also predicted that, as labor force 
competition increased, there would be an increase in interracial killings.  Finally, they 
posited that labor force competition would be associated with an increase in black 
interracial killings.   
Rather than using rates of interracial homicide, the authors used count data.  A 
major methodological challenge in studying interracial homicide is the rarity of the 
events, so they used Poisson regression to estimate parameters – a method well suited 
to studying rare events.  They found support for the power threat hypothesis of 
increased minority population association with increased white interracial killings.  
Additionally, they found that labor force competition had a significant impact on 
black interracial homicides.  As opportunities in the workforce for blacks decreased 
compared to whites, there was an increase in the killing of whites by blacks.  No such 





Race, ethnicity and intergroup violence 
The changing population dynamics in the United States has prompted 
researchers to consider ethnicity in the application of power threat, focusing of the 
Hispanic population (Market, 2010).  Holmes, Smith, Frang and Munoz (2008) 
studied the distribution of policing resources in large Southwestern cities, which tend 
to have a higher Hispanic population.  Using insights from both minority threat and 
rational choice literature, they hypothesized that variables associated with the 
Hispanic population would be related to the distribution of policing resources.  Their 
findings suggested a complex relationship between ethnic identity/race and class.  
Specifically, percent Hispanic was negatively related to police expenditures, contrary 
to the predictions of minority threat.  They also highlighted the importance of making 
within-ethnic distinctions of Hispanics to account for the influence of class.   
 
Traditional measures of threat and the use of interventions 
Recent work on the power threat hypothesis has called into question the 
validity of using percent minority and economic factors to examine power threat.  For 
example, King and Brustein (2006) proposed a political threat model to account for 
levels of intergroup violence.  The main prediction of this model is that violence 
against minority groups will increase as the strength of political parties associated 
with that group increases.  Building on Blalock’s (1967) model, the authors argued 
that the strength of minority group political movements is a potential trigger for 
intergroup violence and that this variable is a stronger predictor than minority group 




in obtaining social, political and economic power , there may be an increase in acts of 
violence committed against this group.  They examined violence against the Jewish 
population in Germany during World War II, using gross domestic product as a 
measure of economic conditions and the size of the Jewish population as a measure of 
group size.  They also included a measure of electoral success of the leftist party to 
represent the political interests of the Jewish people.  They found that the strength of 
the political movement associated with interests of the Jewish population predicted 
anti-Semitic violence, independent of economic conditions and minority group size.  
Chamlin (2009) applied time series analysis to the study of the power threat 
hypothesis.  He, too, questioned the relevance of minority percentage and income 
inequality to power threat, as used in traditional research on the topic.  In his work, he 
pointed out that conflict theorists attribute insidious motives on the part of an elite 
group that has the power to direct resource, such as crime control expenditures.  
Indeed, previous research has identified crime control policies as an example of the 
ability of those in power to regulate less powerful minority groups through the 
implementation of coercive policing practices (Liska, 1992).  Thus, police resources 
are purportedly used to protect the interests of the dominant group (Kent and Jacobs, 
2005).   
In his research, Chamlin (2009) points out that the previous findings of 
relationships between percent minority and crime control policies may be interpreted 
as supporting structural functionalism or power threat theory.  He argues that the 
problem is that these variables represent indirect tests of the power threat hypothesis 




an intervention analysis of the 2001 race riot that took place in Cincinnati, Ohio.  The 
riot was the result of protests from the black community to the shooting of an 
unarmed black teenager.  His outcome measure was the number of robbery arrests 
between 1996 and 2000.  He predicted that as a result of the riots, arrests for robberies 
would increase because policing resources would be shifted to crimes that were most 
likely to be committed against whites by blacks. The results indicated that robbery 
arrests  of blacks did indeed significantly increase after the riots, even controlling for 
robbery offenses during that time period.    
 
 Summary 
The results of previous studies of inter and intraracial violence and crime 
indicate mixed support for power threat theory.  Greater support has been found for 
the relationship between economic competition and interracial violence, particularly 
white on black violence (McCall and Parker, 2005; Stolzenberg  et al., 2002; Jacobs 
and Wood, 1999; Parker and McCall, 1999).  There has been limited support for the 
influence of political competition and interracial violence (King and Brustein, 2007; 
Jacobs and Wood, 1999).  According to Chamlin (2009), studies of power threat 
could benefit from the utilization of longitudinal studies that employ measures of 
direct threat rather than the indirect tests that have been previously conducted.  For 
the present study, these theories provide context for the analysis.  I examine both 
political and socio-legal interventions.   Blalock (1967) originally focused on the 
mobilization of state power to suppress minorities.  Subsequent research has focused 




represented a threat to white domination, setting the stage for intergroup conflict.  
The process model was developed to identify the mechanisms that transform likely 
conflict into actual conflict.  
 
 Application of the Process Model for Anticipating Ethnic Conflict 
In the case of apartheid-era South Africa, the government sought to protect the 
Afrikaner ethnic identity and maintain white domination. Racial purity was linked to 
the Afrikaner ethnicity and the government used racial categorization as a way to 
identify white and nonwhite groups and used that as the mechanism for distributing 
access to resources.   South Africa was facing a number of challenges both internal 
and external, which made sustaining the apartheid system increasingly difficult and 
threatened the balance of power.  According to Marsh and Szayna (2000), these 
challenges included a decrease in the white population and a continuing increase in 
the black population, the process of decolonization throughout Africa, a major shift in 
the South African economy, the international political pressures in the form of 
sanctions and isolation, and the end of communism.   
Two major tipping events in South Africa were the creation of a new 
constitution in 1983 and the infamous Rubicon speech given by then President Botha 
in 1985.  These two events essentially reaffirmed the apartheid state and sought to 
maintain the status quo for the black population.  Botha’s Rubicon speech was 
particularly disappointing to many black South Africans, who expected the 
government to become more inclusive of the non-white population.  Instead, 




policies. In terms of leadership, Nelson Mandela continued to be the symbol of the 
evils of apartheid and he continued to inspire anti-apartheid advocates from prison.  
In terms of organization and resources, the ANC emerged as the foremost anti-
apartheid movement and had extensive ties to external support from sympathizers. 
South Africa had a complex system in that, although there were democratic 
structures in place, they were largely reserved for and designed in the interest of the 
white population.  The state remained exclusive and unresponsive to the needs of the 
non-white populations, especially the black population.  The fiscal capability of South 
Africa was reasonably strong; however, the apartheid system was increasingly 
expensive to maintain.  Finally, the coercive capability of South Africa was extensive 
and the State was more than willing to utilize the military and police resources to 
suppress challengers to the apartheid government. 
In their analysis of South Africa, Marsh and Szayna (2000) conclude that in 
spite of many challenges, there was a relatively peaceful negotiation and transfer of 
power in South Africa during between 1985 and 1989.  While it is true that South 
Africa succeeded in making the transition to a democratic state with no official 
restrictions based on ethnicity or race, there was indeed a significant amount of 
violence that took place during the transition.  The present research improves on the 
qualitative nature of the application of process model to South Africa by applying 
quantitative methods to examine the relationship between actual trends in terrorist 






In this Chapter, I reviewed Blalock’s power threat hypothesis and the process 
model for anticipating ethnic conflict in order to provide a context for examining 
terrorist violence in South Africa.  Framing the conflict in terms of ethnicity allows 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced by both the South 
African government and those who sought to change it.  This is not to say that race 
was unimportant.  Indeed, the creators of apartheid relied extensively on race and 
racial dominance to justify, implement and maintain the system.  In the next Chapter, 
I describe the interventions that I selected and the hypotheses that I tested.  








One of the limitations of the present study is the lack of previous quantitative 
analyses of the impact of socio-legal and/or political interventions on levels of 
terrorism.  Consequently, I conducted an analysis of several policy changes that 
occurred during South Africa’s transition to democracy in order to identify those most 
likely to be associated with changes in terrorism, relying on the theoretical concepts I 
described in the previous chapter.  I specifically focus on the apartheid legislation that 
was implemented by the National Party after the 1948 elections, and subsequently 
repealed during the transition do democracy.  Terrorist violence came from three 
group types: anti-apartheid; separatist; and unknown.  The anti-apartheid and 
separatist attacks were committed by groups either fighting against the government or 
groups that supported the apartheid system.  Unknown groups also committed attacks; 
however, it is not clear whether these attacks came from anti-apartheid or separatist 
groups.  
After identifying a number of legislative reforms, I chose two socio-legal and 
two political reforms for analysis.  The rationale for the selection will be discussed 
below.  As previously mentioned, both types of reforms have been linked to inter-
group violence in the power threat hypothesis (Blalock, 1967) and the process model 
(Marsh and Syzana, 2000).   The socio-legal reforms are the repeal of the pass laws 




announcement of the legalization of formerly outlawed political parties/release of 
Nelson Mandela and the first democratic election.  Before describing the 
interventions, I provide an overview of previous intervention analyses of terrorism.  I 
then review each intervention in detail and provide the hypotheses I developed based 
on each intervention. 
Previous Analyses of Political Interventions and Terrorism 
 
Enders, Sandler and Cauley (1990) used interrupted time series analysis to 
examine the impact of several counter-terrorist interventions, including the 1977 UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents and UN resolutions against General 
Assembly and Security Council Hostage taking (1985) and aerial hijacking (1969-
1970).  They also examined the impact of metal detectors and 1986 US raid against 
Libya.  The results indicated that only the UN resolution against aerial hijackings 
supporting the use of metal detectors had both a short and long term impact on 
decreasing the total number of hijackings.   
Smith (2000) conducted a cross-national study of the relationship between 
liberal policies and democracy on levels of ethnic conflict in Africa.  Ethnic conflict 
was operationalized as a five-point scale of intensity from no ethnic conflict to civil 
war with a substantial ethnic component. He hypothesized that liberal policies, such 
as the restoration of civil rights and freedom from oppressive practices, were 
associated with increases in ethnic conflict. He also hypothesized that 




expect a rise in ethnic clashes as authoritarian governments institute reforms, but that 
the appearance of democratic institutions would eventually decrease overall ethnic 
conflict.  The results suggested that liberal policies were associated with lower levels 
of ethnic conflict and that the implementation of democratic institutions had no 
statistically significant influence on ethnic conflict. The findings of the analysis 
challenged the assumption that instituting liberal reforms and transitioning to 
democratic structures would result in widespread conflict, an argument that has been 
made to forestall the implementation of greater political rights (van de Walle, 1994).   
Barros (2003) included a measure of governing structure in his study of 
terrorist acts committed by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain.  He used time 
series analysis to examine whether having a socialist party in power had an impact on 
levels of terrorism and found that the hard line policies of the socialist party increased 
assassinations.  He concluded that policies should include consideration of both 
deterrence and political solutions.  He also argued that when terrorists lack access to 
legitimate means to address their grievances, they are more likely to adopt violent 
strategies and that banning political expression may lead to increases in terrorism. 
Researchers have also examined the impact of development programs 
designed to prevent terrorism in other countries.  Cragin and Chalk (2004) reviewed 
socio-economic development programs implemented in Israel, the Philippines and the 
United Kingdom that were designed, in part, to prevent the reoccurrence of terrorism.  
In their research, they defined development as “a process whereby the real per capita 




poverty is reduced and inequality in society is generally diminished—or at least not 
increased.” (Cragin and Chalk, 2004: 2; Martinussen, 1997).   
They defined terrorism as the use or threat of violence for the purpose of 
political change.  In a qualitative analysis, they found that social and economic 
policies had the potential to impact the reoccurrence of terrorist violence is particular 
ways.  Specifically, policies that provided resources to expand a middle class lessened 
the pool of terrorist recruits and prevented the development of terrorist safe havens.  
Importantly, they found that social and economic policies that were inadequately 
funded had that potential to increase support for terrorism by inflating expectations.  
They concluded that economic and social improvement policies are an important 
component in a comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and political 
violence.   
The present research improves on these previous studies in a number of 
important ways.  First, rather than examining general terrorism or ethnic conflict, I 
consider specific instances of ethnic terrorism committed by and against ethnically 
opposed groups.  I also focus on explicit macro level reforms that signified changes 
from an ethnically based oligarchy to an inclusive democracy.  These interventions 
may be viewed as actual threats to the existing power structure (Chamlin, 2009). In 
line with Smith (2000), I focus on liberal policies - the reforms that ended restrictions 
on movement and ended the system of racial classification - and democratic 
institutions - legitimation of political parties and the first democratic election. Finally, 




qualitative work that has been conducted.  In the following sections, I provide my 
rationale for the interventions. 
 
Rationale for Selected Socio-Legal Reforms 
Table 2 contains a list of the major socio-legal reforms that took place in 
South Africa before and during the transition to democracy.  These reforms include 
the repeal of the pass laws, the laws prohibiting marriage and sexual relations 
between whites and other races, the race classification law, the residential segregation 
law, and the public segregation law.  Taken together, these regulations established the 
legal framework of the apartheid system.  The underlying purpose of apartheid was to 
protect Afrikaner ethnic identity by regulating the interactions between whites and 
other races in order to ensure racial purity and white domination.  The apartheid laws 
regulated the movement of non-whites through the pass laws by controlling the 
locations and lengths of time non-whites could spend in white areas.  The prohibition 
against marriages and sexual relations between non-whites was meant to curtail race 
mixing, which would have diluted the purity of the white population.  The racial 
segregation laws limited contact between the races in housing and public places.  
Implementing this system required a process of identification, which was 








Table 2.1:  Apartheid Socio-legal Legislation 
 
Legislation Effect Date Legislation Repealed 
The Natives (Abolition of 
Passes and Coordination of 
Documents) Act No. 67 of 1952 
Generally referred to as the pass 
laws. The legislation required all 
black persons over the age of 16 
in all provinces to carry 
identification with them at all 
times. 
Repealed by the Identification Act 
No. 72 of 1986. 
The Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act No. 55 of 1949 
Prohibited marriages between 
white people and people of other 
races. 
Repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 
No. 23 of 1957 and the Immorality 
and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Amendment Act No. 72 of 1985. 
The Immorality Amendment 
Act No. 21 of 1950 
Prohibited adultery, attempted 
adultery or related immoral acts 
between whites and blacks. 
Repealed by the Immorality and 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Amendment Act No. 72 of 1985. 
 
The Population Registration 
Act No. 30 of 1950 
Required identification and 
registration from birth as one of 
four distinct racial groups: White, 
Bantu (Black African), Coloured 
and other. 
Repealed by the Population 
Registration Act Repeal Act No. 114 
of 1991. 
The Group Areas Act No. 41 of 
1950 
Created different residential areas 
for different races. 
Superseded by the Group Areas Acts 
No. 77 of 1957 and No. 36 of 1966 
and repealed by the Abolition of 
Racially Based Land Measures Act 
No. 108 of 1991. 
The Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953 
Forced segregation in all public 
amenities, public buildings and 
public transport with the aim of 
eliminating contact between 
whites and other races. 
Repealed by the Discriminatory 
Legislation Regarding Public 





I selected the repeal of the pass laws and the repeal of the race classification 
system as the two most critical reforms.  The repeal of legislation regarding the 
prohibition of marriages and sexual relations between whites and other races had a 
limited impact, much more so than the repeal of pass laws or race classification laws.  
Mixed marriages represented a very low percentage of marriages in South Africa, 
even after the repeal of these laws.  Jaynes (2007) reports that mixed marriages 




Prior to the enactment of the laws, there were reportedly 75 mixed race marriages 
compared to 28,000 white marriages (Glucksmann, 2010).  In contrast, the pass laws 
affected millions of non-whites, especially native Africans, who were forced to 
contend with pass regulations on a daily basis.  According to Savage (1986), 
17,745,000 Africans were arrested or prosecuted for violating the pass laws in South 
Africa between 1916 and 1984.   
The repeal of the residential and public segregation laws would also have had 
a limited impact.  By the time of the repeal of these laws, segregation had become the 
norm and the majority of native Africans lacked the economic means to overcome 
segregated housing arrangements in particular.  Horne (1991) noted that South Africa 
had essentially transition from de jure to de facto apartheid and that repealing race-
based laws was not sufficient to end inequality because whites maintained economic 
privilege.  Consequently, the threat to whites posed by the repeal of these laws was 
limited in scope. 
The repeal of the pass laws, on the other hand, posed a greater threat because 
these laws regulated the movement of non-whites in and out of urban areas and 
provided the authorities with a means to arrest and detain those not in compliance 
(Ross, 2005).  Without these laws, the prospect of non-whites moving freely in and 
out of formerly restricted areas would be perceived as a substantial threat to whites 
(Blalock, 1967).  The Population Registration Act provided the foundation for the 
other apartheid laws, such as the segregation restrictions, because it protected racial 
purity (Eddings, 1991), reinforced the Afrikaner ethnic identity and determined the 




of the most restrictive apartheid era laws to be abolished (Kraft, 1991). In the next 
two sections, I describe the interventions and my predictions.   
 Repeal of Pass Laws – July 1, 1986  
Pass laws have a long history in South Africa, with the first appearance of the 
pass system occurring in 1760 in the Cape where slaves were required to carry 
documentation in order to travel (Ross, 2005; Omond, 1986; Savage, 1986; Frankel, 
1979).  The National Party codified apartheid era pass laws in 1952 under the Blacks 
(Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act No. 67.  Prior to the 
passage of the Act, the pass laws differed within each province.  The newly enacted 
legislation required all black Africans to be issued reference books in all provinces 
(Omond, 1986).   
The South African government relied on pass laws to regulate the movement 
of black Africans and to ensure the availability of a cheap supply of much needed 
labor to the white population, as well as to the farms and mining operations (Ross, 
2005; Savage, 1986; Frankel, 1979).  Black Africans over the age of 16 were required 
to carry identification books at all times and could not be in areas designated for 
white South Africans for more than 72 hours without special permission (Omond, 
1986).  They were required to present the identification book at any time to an 
authorized official, and those who violated pass laws were subject to fines and/or 
imprisonment (Savage, 1986).   
The abolition of a system that had been in place for over 200 years was a 
dramatic turn of events.  This reform meant that blacks could move into formerly 




jobs, creating a significant shift in the balance of power (Blalock, 1967).  A more 
practical reason for choosing this intervention is that the native Africans were no 
longer required to carry the passbook. In fact, burning passbooks became an 
important form of protest for anti-apartheid groups.  Figure 2 shows Nelson Mandela 
burning his passbook in protest of the pass laws in 1960.   
 
 Figure 2: Photograph of Nelson Mandela burning his pass book 
 
Figure 5.16 Page 237 Nelson Mandela burning his pass, 1960. Photograph by Eli Weinberg. 
EW14-4-1. UWC. Robben Island Museum Mayibuye Archives 
 
There was an important symbolic aspect to being able to discard the hated 
passbooks.  The South African government did issue identity documents to all 
citizens, leading President Botha, in 1985, to point out that even he had to carry such 
a document, suggesting that the system of passes operated equally among the races 
(Omond, 1986).  However, the records of arrest indicated that between 1975 and 
1985, 637, 584 Africans were prosecuted for not carrying their reference books, 2 




time (Omond, 1986). Pass laws were a continual source of discontent that subjected 
black Africans to unemployment, squatting, and severe economic exploitation 
(Frankel, 1979).  The passive resistance campaigns in the 1950’s were demonstrations 
against the pass laws.  These protests resulted in the Sharpeville Massacre in March 
1960, where South African Police fired on an unarmed crowd, resulting in 69 
fatalities  (Ross, 2005).  The pass laws became a significant burden not only to the 
black population, but also to the South African government, which devoted an 
enormous amount of resources to maintaining the system (Ross, 2005; Beck, 2000).  
Additionally, the pass law system became increasingly unpopular within South Africa 
and in the international community, prompting the government to officially abolish 
the system and begin a process of ‘orderly urbanization’ (Ogura, 1996; Battersby, 
1988:1).   
According to the process model for anticipating ethnic conflict, the repeal of 
the pass laws signified an opening of closure based on ethnicity in the social and 
potentially the economic sectors of society (Marsh and Szayna, 2000), representing a 
direct threat to the power held by South African whites (Blalock, 1967). This reform 
also occurred earlier in the process of transition, before anyone was clear of the 
direction in which the government would advance in terms of the process of 
democratization.  From a power threat perspective, the repeal of the pass laws 
increased the perception of threat to whites in South Africa by increasing the potential 
for encounters with non-whites, creating greater opportunities for negative social 
interaction.  The repeal of the pass laws also presented an economic threat to whites, 




the constant threat of presenting passbooks to the authorities to justify their presence 
in white areas.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The abolition of pass laws will be associated with a decrease in 
anti-apartheid terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The abolition of pass laws will be associated with a decrease in 
anti-apartheid terrorist fatalities  
 
Hypothesis 1c:  The abolition of pass laws will be associated with an increase 
in separatist terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 1d:  The abolition of pass laws will be associated with an increase 
in separatist terrorist fatalities 
 
 
Repeal of the Race Classification Law June 17, 1991 
 
Similar to pass laws, the race classification system implemented during the 
apartheid period had roots in the colonial system that preceded the establishment of 
the Union of South Africa and was based on the desire of the white government to 
maintain control over both the white non-white populations (Khalfani and Zuberi, 
2001; Posel, 2001; Beck, 2000).  The National Party codified race classification in the 
Population Registration Act of 1950, legislation aimed at preserving the racial purity 
of the Afrikaners by clearly establishing the racial identity of each citizen (Posel, 
2001).  The Act required each person in South Africa to be classified into one of three 
categories to be recorded in a national registry (Christopher, 2002).  The three 
categories were White, Coloured and Native.
2
 For purposes of the Act, the following 
definitions applied: 
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A white person is one who in appearance is, or who is generally accepted as, a 
white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance is 
obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person. Section 
1(xv) 
A “native” is a person who is in fact or is generally accepted as a member of 
any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. Section 1(x) 
A coloured person is a person who is not a white person nor a native. Section 
1(iii) 
 The Native and Coloured identities contained subcategories for other populations 
such as Asians and Indians.  Of course whites were assigned the task of determining 
to which race a person belonged.  The determination was based on physical 
characteristics, such as skin color, hair texture, nose shape, and lip size.  For example, 
if a person’s hair could be successfully wrapped around a pencil, this person was 
considered non-white (Posel, 2001).  Barbers were called as expert witnesses in such 
cases. The government established a Race Classification Appeal Board in order to 
establish the race of individuals in borderline cases.  Beck (2000) described the case 
of Sandra Laing, a female who schoolmates believed was mixed race, in spite of the 
fact that her family had been classified as White Afrikaners.  The Board reclassified 
Ms. Laing as Coloured, upon which she was expelled from school and treated as an 
outcast.  Thus, the process of racial classification was at times arbitrary, relying on 
the subjective judgments of those in positions of power (Posel, 2001). 
The repeal of the race classification law was the final step in a 17 month 




for a new constitution (Kraft, 1991). The removal of racial classification system was 
an attempt to eliminate the discrimination and bias that were essential to the apartheid 
system (Khalfani and Zuberi, 2001).  According to the process model, the repeal of 
this law signified an end to closure based on racial categorization for non-whites 
(Marsh and Szyana, 2000); however, for whites, it represented an end to white 
privilege and further threatened the white power structure (Blalock, 1967).  In fact, all 
the parliamentary members of the right wing of the National Party voted against 
abolishing the law (Kraft, 1991), demonstrating that Afrikaner resistance to white 
privilege continued, despite the changes taking place in the country.  From a power 
threat perspective, the end of the system of privilege based on racial identity directly 
threatened the status of whites as the dominant group (Blalock, 1967).  
 
Hypothesis 2a: The abolition of race classification laws will be associated with 
a decrease in anti-apartheid terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The abolition of race classification laws will be associated with 
a decrease in anti-apartheid terrorist fatalities  
 
Hypothesis 2c:  The abolition of race classification laws will be associated with 
an increase in separatist terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 2d:  The abolition of race classification laws will be associated with 




 Figure 3 is a visual illustration of the above listed hypotheses for the socio-
legal interventions. I list the interventions and the time series, and indicate whether I 
expect the series to increase or decrease in relation to the intervention.  I expect that 
anti-apartheid attacks and fatalities should decrease overall in relation to the repeal of 




increase in relation to these interventions, as the represent important threats to the 
apartheid system and white privilege.  I declined to make predictions for the unknown 
attacks and fatalities because I am unclear as to the source of these attacks.  
Figure 3:      Model for socio-legal interventions 
 
 
Expansion of Socio-legal Rights  
 
     -       
      Anti-Apartheid Attacks and Fatalities 
 Legalization  +   
     Separatist Attacks and Fatalities 
     
    -   
      Anti-Apartheid Attacks and Fatalities 
 Election  -  
     Separatist Attacks and Fatalities 
     
 
 
Rationale for Selected Political Reforms 
Table 2.2 contains a list of the major political legislation enacted during the 
apartheid era that was repealed. Native Africans faced political alienation for decades.  
The ban on oppositional political organizations and on communism in particular 
prevented non-whites from legally organizing against the apartheid government. As 
discussed in chapter 1, members of the black population were moved to bantustans or 
homelands based on their ethnic identity.  The apartheid government regarded these 
homelands as separate political bodies.  The effect of the homeland legislation was 
the complete disenfranchisement of native Africans from voting rights in South 
Africa.  Additionally, native Africans lost citizenship in South Africa and all the 




The government outlawed oppositional groups in 1960, making it impossible 
for anti-apartheid groups to express grievances through legal means.  Marsh and 
Szayna (2000) identify closure in the political sector as one of the indicators of 
potential conflict.  Similarly, Blalock (1967) identified the restriction of political 
rights as a mechanism of repression used by the dominant group in the power threat 
theory.  Without access to political resources, groups may opt for violent means to 
seek redress for their concerns. The mechanisms of political disenfranchisement were 
repealed in a piecemeal fashion.  It was not until the actual vote that real change took 
place.  Even the Electoral Act, passed in January of 1994, which set out the process of 
elections had as much of an impact as the actual election.  The 1994 elections 
signified the beginning of majority rule in South Africa, rather than a step in 
preparation for the transition to democracy.   The right to vote is one of the 
fundamental elements of a democratic society (Dhami, 2005).  Dahl (1998) argues 
that all adult citizens of a state should have both equal and effective opportunity to 
make a contribution to the political agenda and also to vote on such matters.  On 
April 26-29th, 1994 South Africa staged its first democratic election, in which all 










Table 2.2:  Apartheid Era Political Legislation 
 
Legislation Effect Date Legislation Repealed 
The Separate Representation of 
Voters Act No. 46 of 1951 
Separate Representation of 
Voters Amendment Act No. 30 
of 1956 
Removed Coloureds and Asians 
from the common voters' roll in 
the Cape and placed them on a 
communal roll. Africans in the 
Cape had already been removed 
from the common roll in 1936 
The Electoral Act, 202 of 1993, was 
promulgated on 14 January 1994 and 
it set out the basic rules for national 
and provincial elections, which were 
held on April 26-29, 1994 
The Bantu Authorities Act No. 
68 of 1951 
Established the black homelands 
and regional authorities and 
provided greater self-
government in the homelands. 
Repealed by the Black Communities 
Development Act No. 4 of 1984. 
The Separate Representation of 
Voters Amendment Act No. 50 
of 1968  
 
Formed the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council with 
forty elected members and 
twenty nominated members. The 
Repealed by the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act No. 110 of 
1983. 
The Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act (National States 
Citizenship Act) No. 26 of 1970 
Formed the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council with 
forty elected members and 
twenty nominated members. The 
Repealed by the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 
of 1993. 
The Suppression of 
Communism Act No. 44 of 
1950 
Outlawed communism and the 
Community Party in South 
Africa. 
Repealed by the Internal Security and 
Intimidation Amendment Act No. 138 
of 1991. 
The Prohibition of Political 
Interference Act No. 51 of 1968 
Forbade political parties with a 
racially mixed membership. 
Repealed by the Constitutional 
Affairs Amendment Act No. 104 of 
1986. 
The Unlawful Organisations 
Act No. 34 of 1960 
Declared organizations 
perceived as threatening public 
safety unlawful. The ANC and 
the PAC were immediately 
declared unlawful. Repealed by 
the Internal Security Act No. 74 
of 1982; however, the ban on 
political organizations remained 
in effect. 
On February 2, 1990, President F.W. 
DeKlerk unbanned these 
organizations under the authority of 







Legalization of Outlawed Political Parties/ Release of Nelson Mandela 
Announced – February 2, 1990 
 
Two important events or catalysts occurred on February 2, 1990: then South 
African president, FW DeKlerk, announced that a number of political prisoners, 
including Nelson Mandela, were to be granted unconditional release from prison 
(Charney, 1999) and that the 30-year ban on political opposition groups, such as the 
ANC, was lifted.  While the release of Nelson Mandela was expected, the legalization 
of the political parties came as a complete surprise to nearly everyone (Usborne, 
2010).  This announcement signaled the end of the apartheid system and the 
beginning of the process of democratization in South Africa and represented a direct 
threat to the political dominance of the white minority government.  In fact, shortly 
after the speech, the right wing segment of the National Party and other reactionary 
groups such as the Conservative Party called for a no confidence vote against 
DeKlerk and swore revenge upon him.  “In far-off Pretoria and the Afrikaans 
heartland in the Orange Free State, there would be rallies where demonstrators 
chanted ‘Hang de Klerk, hang Mandela’ and for good measure, in case they felt left 
out, ‘hang the Jews’ (Usborne, 2010:5).  
Granting access to non-whites to the political process represented a major 
threat to the white population. The threat of the loss of political power and the end of 
white dominance in the political sphere elicited extreme reactions from the many 
Afrikaners and their representatives in parliament, which is in line with Blalock’s 
(1967) power threat hypothesis: groups facing the loss of power will resort to act of 




change in the balance of power is one of the indicators of transforming potential 
conflict into likely conflict in the process model.  As Marsh and Szayna (2000) point 
out, the group facing a loss of status may mobilize and resort to violence in order to 
prevent the challenging groups from gaining power.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Legalization political parties will be associated with a 
decrease in anti-apartheid terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Legalization political parties will be associated with a 
decrease in anti-apartheid terrorist fatalities 
 
Hypothesis 3c:  Legalization political parties will be associated with an 
increase in separatist terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 3d:  Legalization political parties will be associated with an 





First Democratic Election – April 26-29, 1994 
By holding the first democratic election in which all eligible members of the 
South African population could vote, regardless of race, the South African 
government resolved a major political grievance and this was a significant policy 
change in the closure of the political system.  Indeed, as Marsh and Szayna (2000) 
point out, the ability of the government to accommodate challenges by opposition 
groups is key to preventing potential ethnic conflict into likely ethnic conflict.  As 
Smith (2000) argued, the establishment of democratic structures should help to 
resolve ethnic conflict by providing groups with access to political institutions that 
address grievances.  This would mean that all groups would rely less on violent 




prediction that once minority groups are able to assert their rights within the political 
arena, attacks against them should cease.  The first democratic election signified the 
successful mobilization and resolution of long-standing grievances on the part of anti-
apartheid groups.  More importantly, the political system in South Africa, which was 
dramatically out of balance, finally reached a point of equilibrium in the sense that 
the numerical minority no longer ruled over the numerical majority.  That combined 
with open access for all to the democratic structures would decrease reliance on 
violence (Smith, 2000). 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The first democratic election will be associated with a decrease 
in anti-apartheid terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The first democratic election will be associated with a decrease 
in anti-apartheid terrorist fatalities 
 
Hypothesis 4c:  The first democratic election will be associated with a decrease 
in separatist terrorist attacks  
 
Hypothesis 4d:  The first democratic election will be associated with a decrease 
in separatist terrorist fatalities 
 
 
Figure 4 is a visual illustration of the above listed hypotheses for the political 
interventions. I list both interventions and the time series, and indicate whether I 
expect the series to increase or decrease in relation to the intervention.  Similar to the 
socio-legal interventions, anti-apartheid attacks and fatalities should decrease.   
Separatist attacks and fatalities should increase for the legalization intervention, but 
should decrease in relation to the election intervention.  I predict a decrease for this 
intervention because after the establishment of stable political structures, groups 




again decline to make a prediction for the unknown attacks and fatalities for the 
political interventions since I am unsure as to the source of these incidents. 
 
Figure 4:       Model for political hypotheses 
 
 
Expansion of Political Rights  
 
     -       
      Anti-Apartheid Attacks and Fatalities 
 Legalization  +   
     Separatist Attacks and Fatalities 
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 Election   -  
     Separatist Attacks and Fatalities 





In this Chapter, I reviewed selected social and political reforms that brought 
about major changes in the power structure of South Africa. I also developed 
hypotheses for each intervention.  Anti-apartheid attacks and fatalities are expected to 
decrease overall.  Separatist attacks are expected to increase prior to the election.  
After the election, separatist attacks and fatalities should also decrease.   In the next 




Chapter 5: Data and Methodology 
Overview 
In this dissertation, I test the relationship between four major reforms and terrorist 
attacks and fatalities from attacks committed by anti-apartheid, separatist and 
unknown terrorist groups.  In Chapter 4, I provided a review of the hypotheses that I 
test in the study.  In this Chapter, I describe the data sources, variables of interest, and 
the analytic method I used in the study.   
 
Data 
Background of the Global Terrorism Database 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is currently the most comprehensive 
unclassified event data based on terrorist attacks around the world. As noted in 
Chapter 2, the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) collected the original 
data upon which the GTD is based.   PGIS defined terrorism as “[t]he threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184).  
Specially trained coders searched for and identified acts of terrorism for PGIS 
worldwide between1970 and 1997, resulting in the collection of over 67,000 attacks 
(Dugan, LaFree, Cragin, and Kasupski, 2008).  Coders specifically excluded acts of 
criminality, violence resulting from conflicts between military/armed forces, and acts 




incident level information on terrorist incidents from a variety of open sources, such 
as wire services, newspapers, and U.S. State Department reports (LaFree and Dugan, 
2007).   
PGIS data files were provided in hardcopy form to researchers at the 
University of Maryland (UMD) in 2001 (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). With funding 
from the National Institute of Justice, researchers at UMD subsequently created a 
computerized set of the data with the assistance of trained coders who verified the 
incidents through 1997, a process that was finished in December of 2005.  In 2006, 
researchers from the University of Maryland Center for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) acquired additional funding from the Department 
of Homeland Security Human Factors-Behavioral Science Division to collect data on 
terrorist incidents that occurred after 1997 for inclusion in the GTD.  A rigorous 
process was developed to maintain the integrity of the original PGIS data, and efforts 
were undertaken to update the selection criteria for the collection of the additional 
data.  The new data collection extended the data through March 2008 (LaFree, 2010), 
and an updated version of the GTD was released in March 2009.  Most recently, 
START worked with the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) at New 
Haven University to extend terrorism data collection for the GTD through 2010.  The 
GTD data used for this dissertation were downloaded on January 2, 2012 and include 






Database Strengths and Limitations 
As with all datasets, the GTD does have some strengths and limitations.  Two 
important strengths of the GTD data are (1) they were not collected by a government 
agency, which limits the potential for politically-based influence in the selection of 
events; and (2) they include both international and domestic acts of terrorism (LaFree, 
2010).  This second point is especially important in the case of South Africa, where 
virtually all modern terrorism has been domestic in that it was committed by groups 
within the country against the South African government as opposed to other nations 
or governments.  Another strength is that the data are periodically updated and 
verified to ensure that the most accurate information is available.  The case of South 
Africa demonstrates the value of this approach.  After the transition to democracy, 
greater and more detailed information on terrorist events became available from a 
variety of sources, including the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and numerous books and articles that have been written about apartheid era South 
Africa.   
One weakness of the GTD is that data from the year 1993 are missing (Lee, 
2008).  These data were lost by PGIS in an office move and have never been fully 
recovered.  These missing data present a challenge to the analysis of the South Africa 
data because a tremendous amount of terrorism occurred during this year.  In fact, the 
year 1993 accounted for the highest number of attacks and fatalities in the dataset.   
Conducting analyses with missing data can lead to misleading results or may produce 
bias in the estimates.  One option is to leave the missing data out of the analyses.  




imputing the data with methods such as linear interpolation or the mean of nearby 
points would result in undercounting the number of attacks and fatalities.  The 
marginals or totals for the year 1993 are known for terrorist attacks and fatalities in 
South Africa; however, I am conducting a semi-annual analysis, which limits my 
ability to use these totals, especially since I further break down the data by source 
type. In order to overcome the limitation in the best manner possible, I calculated the 
1993 data by adding the total number of attacks or fatalities 1992 and 1994 for each 
series and divided by two
3
.  I then applied these data points to the 1993 half years for 
attacks and fatalities.  This method should bring provide a more realistic estimate of 
the missing data.  I also ran models with and without the 1993 data and compare the 
results  
Another weakness of the GTD is that like all unclassified event databases, it 
contains a large number of anonymous/unknown attacks.  This presents a major 
problem for my analysis because I partition the data in categories depending on the 
source of the attack.  Attributing attacks to the wrong source would artificially 
increase or decrease the number of attacks or fatalities from a particular group, 
introducing bias.  Because of the dynamics of terrorism in South Africa, I examine 
the unknown cases separately.  I provide a more detailed discussion of the reasons for 
the separate analysis below. 
Another potential weakness is the differences in data collection.  The data 
from 1970 to 1997 were collected by PGIS at the time of each event; whereas, the 
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 For example, in 1992 there were a total of 31 anti-apartheid attacks and in 1994, there were a total of 
17 attacks. I added these two totals together and obtained 48 attacks for the two years combined.  I 
divided 48 by two, leaving 24 incidents for the first half of 1993 and 24 attacks for the second half of 




data from 1998 to the present were and are being assembled by researchers at the 
University of Maryland. Because the post-1997 data are being collected 
retrospectively, they are likely to be underestimated, which means that the apparent 
decreases in terrorism after may actually reflect differences in data collection, rather 
than actual decreases in terrorist activity. 
Updating the GTD 
  
One of the goals of START is to continually update and verify the cases 
included in the GTD.  To that end, researchers regularly investigate other open 
sources for additional data that may be incorporated into the GTD.  While working 
for the START Center, I discovered another source of data on terrorism in South 
Africa that came from a submission made to the South Africa Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (Commission). The Commission was established in 1995 
to investigate human rights abuses in apartheid-era South Africa.  The Report, titled 
Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to Questions 
raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, is a collection of terrorist 
attacks compiled from published news reports and Annual Surveys of the South 
Africa Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) and was submitted to the Commission in 
May 1997 (List of MK Operations, 1997).   
According to the Report (1997), there was not enough specific information 
about attacks committed during the 1960s and early 1970s; therefore, the actual data 
entered into the GTD begins on November 30, 1976.  The last incident in the Report 
occurred in November 1989. One of the major obstacles to collecting any information 




which no doubt made it more difficult to locate accurate reporting of all political 
events, including those involving terrorist attacks.  This may explain why the original 
PGIS data collection team did not identify many of the attacks.  The information 
collected in the Report (1997) came from domestic sources within South Africa 
where there was greater information available from local publications.  PGIS data 
were typically collected from national and international news sources (LaFree and 
Dugan, 2007), making it more difficult for the original coders to locate attacks that 
were only reported in local news sources.  
 
 Combining the GTD and the TRC data 
Combining these additional cases with the GTD raised important challenges.  
The biggest difficulty was the lack of a definition of terrorism in the Report (1997), 
which made it hard to determine which of the incidents described qualified as 
terrorism given the definition used by the GTD. The incidents listed in the Report 
(1997) include acts of illegal violence and, similar to the GTD, the information was 
collected from open sources including newspapers and SAIRR Annual Reports.  
Additionally, the types of incidents captured in the Report (1997) include a wide 
variety of targets, such as police, military, economic, government, and business 
institutions.  Another important aspect of these incidents is that they were not 
collected by any government agency, although they were collected for submission to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  The benefit of this fact is that the 
Commission encouraged the utmost honesty in all submissions in order to fulfill its 




Another challenge was that a number of the incidents were listed as unknown, 
meaning that no group claimed or was held responsible for the attack.  This, however, 
is not an unusual situation in terrorism datasets (Hoffman, 2008). Studies of terrorism 
show that a relatively high percent of all incidents are never claimed by any group  
(B. Hoffman, 1997; Rapoport, 1997).   A report by RAND published in 1985 revealed 
that between 1980 and 1982, 60 percent of international terrorist incidents were 
unclaimed and that nearly 40 percent of such incidents in the 1970s were unclaimed.  
LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, and Scott (2006) found that approximately 50 percent of the 
cases in the Global Terrorism Database were attributed to a particular group.  In the 
present study, 51.4% of the data contained an unknown group name. I included these 
unknown incidents into the final dataset.  I provide a more detailed discussion of 
unknown/anonymous attacks in South Africa in the discussion below. 
The incidents in the Report (1997) were organized chronologically and to 
varying degrees included information on the date, type of attack, target, location of 
the attack, the number of wounded, and the number of casualties.  I identified a total 
of 551 incidents for inclusion in the GTD.  The next step was to determine the 
number, if any, of duplicate cases in the GTD.  Table 4 shows the breakdown of data 
prior to the addition of the TRC data.  The original GTD contained 202 incidents that 
were committed by the ANC and 1125 incidents committed by unknown groups.  
After doing extensive comparisons between the two data sets, I identified 102 
incidents that were already present in the GTD; therefore, I excluded these cases, 
leaving a total of 449 additional cases.  Of the duplicate cases, 36 were ANC 




Following the guidelines of the GTD manual for entering information in the database, 
the author and two researchers from START entered these data into the GTD in 2007.  
Of the 449 cases added to the GTD, the ANC committed 398 and unknown groups 
committed 51.   
Table 4.1:  Incidents in the GTD, TRC, Combined Data, and Duplicate Cases 
Group  GTD TRC Combined Duplicates 
African National Congress 202 398 600 36 
Unknown 1125 51 1176 63 
Other Groups 145 0 145 3 
Total 1472 449 1921 102 
 
Determining Ethnic Affiliation  
Determining ethnicity is an important endeavor for this dissertation.  The main 
goal of the analysis is to determine whether levels of ethically based terrorism 
changed as different macro level policy changes were put into place.  Unfortunately, 
there were many instances where an incident was not attributed to a particular group, 
making it difficult to determine whether an anti-apartheid or separatist group 
committed the attack.  Hoffman (1997) points out that one of the prevalent beliefs 
about terrorism is that groups who engage in this form of violence seek attention and 
publicity for their acts. Some theories of terrorism contain the proposition that the 
purpose of an act of terrorism is to influence the public, presumably through media 
attention (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004; US State Department, cited in Hoffman, 
1998).  Hoffman (2004) argues that terrorist groups claim credit for acts for a number 




specific demand; 3) maintaining a base of support or sympathy; and 4) maintaining 
membership in the organization or recruiting new members.  
According to Hoffman (2004), terrorist groups may decline to claim 
responsibility for specific acts due to fear of retaliation by the state or concern of 
backlash from the supporting base.  Despite the fact that there has not been an 
extensive amount of research on anonymous and unattributed terrorism, it is not 
unusual for terrorists to not claim or seek credit for their acts.  Hoffman (1999) argues 
that the failure to claim credit for terrorist acts is a reflection of overall changes in 
more recent terrorism.  He points out that in the past, particularly during the 1970’s 
and 1980’s, terrorists would often issue communiqués in which they would take 
credit for attacks and offer lengthy explanations.  A number of high profile terrorist 
attacks have gone unclaimed, leading BHoffman (1999) to suggest that this may be a 
function of lethality or that groups may not feel the need to explain their actions to a 
larger audience.   
Stepanova (2008) observed that when there is widespread violence occurring 
in a country it can be difficult to differentiate criminal acts from ethnic violence and 
terrorism.  This is likely to be true during intense periods of conflict, such as the 
situation in South Africa during the transition to democracy.  Anti-apartheid groups 
such as the ANC had less of an incentive to claim acts of terrorism, particularly 
because they officially denounced terrorist tactics in 1990.  Their motivation for 
continuing to engage in terrorist tactics during the transition to democracy would be 
due to uncertainty surrounding the future of negotiations.  Additionally, there was a 




the ANC, and a number of attacks in during the transition were committed by the 
ANC against IFP.  Furthermore, if they continued to claim attacks, they would 
damage their credibility during the negotiations.  Separatist forces also had reason to 
avoid claiming responsibility for attacks, inasmuch as they too were interested in 
preserving a place in the new government.   
Although it is possible to employ strategies to attribute attacks to particular 
groups (Cohen, Jenkins and Kellen, 1985), I chose to conduct a separate analysis of 
the unknown cases.   This is because there are some indications that a “third force” 
was active during the transition to apartheid and is responsible for a significant 
number of the unknown attacks (Melander, 2002; Zulu,1992).  According to the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission South Africa Report (2003), the term third force 
refers to an organized group of elite government-affiliated individuals who conducted 
random attacks against the civilian population during the transition to democracy.  If 
a third force was at work, this could have important policy implications for 
governments in transition.  Failure to reign in the rouge actors within state agencies 
could compromise negotiations and decrease the legitimacy of the emerging, 
reformed government.   
Indeed, a wave of violence during the early 1990s resulted in thousands of 
deaths and injuries from violence perpetrated in KwaZulu, Natal and the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging Transvaal region.  Some of these deaths were attributed 
to the conflict between the ANC and the IFP; however, the perpetrators of many more 




South African Police and members of IFP suggested that another layer of violence 
was taking place.   
The Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch (1991) reported that the South 
African Police force and the KwaZulu Police force collaborated against ANC 
supporters.  Their activities included assisting in attacks, transporting IFP supporters 
to areas inhabited by ANC members, and refusing to assist ANC supporters who were 
under attack. Furthermore, the government of South Africa did little to curb these 
abuses despite the evidence presented to them of complicity by the security forces 
(Human Rights Watch, 1993).  Thus, unknown attacks are an important component of 
the analysis that will be analyzed separately.  If these unknown attacks are the work 
of a ‘third force’ then they may represent a form of state-sponsored terrorism 
(Blalock, 1967). Furthermore, the government never officially confirmed the 
existence of a third force and did not take responsibility for the attacks, thus, I am 
reluctant to state definitively whether these attacks were solely from a third force.  Of 
course, it may be the case that these incidents are a combination of anonymous 
attacks committed by anti-apartheid, separatist groups, and third force groups.  
Without greater information, it is impossible to determine the actual source of the 
data; however, an analysis of these incidents may be able to provide some insight into 
the dynamics of unknown terrorism and perhaps their source.  
Thanks to the richness of the GTD dataset, I had access to information on 
terrorist attacks, which I used to partition the data into anti-apartheid and separatist 
attacks.  The TRC data also included information is some cases that allowed me to 




group, although the majority of the TRC cases were committed by the ANC.  In cases 
where the group name was unknown, I conducted additional research on the incidents 
in order to categorize the attack.  One of the benefits of the passage of time in South 
Africa is that additional literature such as books and reports has become available 
regarding terrorist incidents that took place during the apartheid era.  The activities of 
the Commission added to this information because it allowed individuals who 
participated in political violence to submit detailed accounts of their involvement in 
terrorist acts.  Many of those attacks, however, were committed by unknown or 
anonymous groups and, to my knowledge, no one had actually used the confessions 
to identify unclaimed terrorist attacks.  In the next sections, I describe the steps I took 




The first step was to categorize attacks clearly committed by anti-apartheid 
groups identified in the GTD.  As demonstrated in Table 2, the majority of anti-
apartheid attacks were committed by the ANC.  Although the ANC officially 
denounced violent tactics in 1989, its members continued to engage in terrorist acts 
through the 1990s.  I categorized these attacks as anti-apartheid attacks because this 
group was engaged in conflict against the apartheid South African government.  I also 
coded attacks committed by other oppositional groups as anti-apartheid attacks.  
 




Group Name Frequency Percent 
African National Congress (South Africa) 600 96.6% 
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO) 3 0.5% 
Black Nationalists 4 0.6% 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 3 0.5% 
South African Liberation Support Cadre 
(SALSC) 3 0.5% 
South-West Africa People's Organization 
(SWAPO) 5 0.8% 
Urban Guerrillas 2 0.3% 
Xhosa Tribal Workers 1 0.2% 
 
The next step was to categorize anonymous attacks as anti-apartheid. Anti-
apartheid groups such as the ANC had less of an incentive to claim acts of terrorism 
during the transition to democracy, particularly because they officially denounced 
terrorist tactics in 1990.  Furthermore, if they continued to claim attacks, they would 
damage their credibility during the negotiations.  I reviewed each unknown case 
individually, examining the target, tactic, weapon, and year of the attack.  As noted in 
Table 3, I added in a total of 48 additional cases to the anti-apartheid attacks.  The 
majority of the attacks coded as anti-apartheid were those committed against Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) by the ANC.  Additional incidents include attacks against 
political and government targets.  The majority of these attacks occurred prior to 
1990, the time when the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups were most active.  The 









Table 4.3:  Unknown cases that were attributed to anti-apartheid forces 
Category 
Freq
. Percent Description 
IFP 22 45.8% 
Attacks committed against IFP political figures, transportation, 
party meetings, members, headquarters, funerals, supporters, 
rallies, and homesteads; Attacks against rival separatist group 
Political 12 25.0% 
Attacks against apartheid government members, including 
prime minister, president, and pre-1990 election targets 
Governm
ent 4 8.3% 
Homeland consulate, government based political parties,   
Consulates viewed as supporting apartheid government 
Business 3 6.3% Whites only affiliated businesses, IFP supported business 
Police 3 6.3% Residence of police supporting apartheid government 
AWB 1 2.1% Attack against opposing pro-apartheid terrorist group 
Civilian 1 2.1% Whites only housing 
Railway 1 2.1% Transportation target sabotage 
School 1 2.1% 
Afrikaans school 





My approach to categorizing separatist attacks was the same as that for the 
anti-apartheid attacks.  I began by selecting all the cases that were committed by 
identifiable separatist groups.  Table 4 lists the name and frequency of the attacks 
committed by recognized separatist groups in the GTD.  An identifiable separatist 
group committed a total 93 attacks during the time frame of the study.  The majority 
of these groups committed one attack.  The IFP was responsible for most of the 
incidents separatist attacks of those where a group name was listed.  Many of the 






Table 4.4:  Separatist groups and attack frequency  
Group Name Frequency Percent 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 48 51.6% 
White Extremists 12 12.9% 
White Wolves 9 9.7% 
Right-Wing Extremists 5 5.4% 
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) 5 5.4% 
Boere Aanvals Troepe (BAT) 3 3.2% 
Wit Kommando 1 1.1% 
White Liberation Army 1 1.1% 
United Democratic Front (UDF) 1 1.1% 
Rival Zulu Group, name not stated 1 1.1% 
Orde Boerevolk 1 1.1% 
Nazi Boerestat Party 1 1.1% 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) 1 1.1% 
Individual affiliated with separatist group 1 1.1% 
Civil Cooperation Bureau 1 1.1% 
Boer Sentries 1 1.1% 
Boer Republikeinse Leer 1 1.1% 
 
 
Separatist forces also had reason to avoid claiming responsibility for attacks, 
inasmuch as they too were interested in preserving a place in the new government.  
They also would have less of an incentive to claim responsibility if their actions were 
undertaken as part of the ‘third force’ activities that were supposedly taking place 
during the early 1990s.  According to the Human Rights Watch (1993), the tactics 
utilized by the third force were designed to generate fear and to destabilize the 
transition to democracy.  They identified numerous accounts of attacks on commuters 
using trains, buses and taxis.  These attacks also involved armed men indiscriminately 




I reviewed each unknown case individually to determine how it should be 
categorized, examining the target, tactic, weapon, and year of the attack.  Table 5 
contains the category, frequency and description of the attacks that I attributed to 
separatist groups.  The majority of the cases that were added include attacks against 
transportation targets, the ANC and political targets.  I added in a total of 201 cases to 
the separatist attacks.    
 
Table 4.5:  Unknown cases that were attributed to separatist forces 
Category 
Freq
. Percent Description  
Commuter 51 25% 
Commuters on trains, buses, taxis, in train stations, at taxi stands 
Commuter attacks were attributed if the occurred from 1990 forward, 
involved firearms, and were attacks persons waiting for transportation 
ANC 37 18% 
Individual members of the ANC, residences of members, offices of 
members, relatives of members, meetings of members, vehicles carrying 
members 
Attacks against ANC targets, any year, any method, any weapon 
Political 32 16% 
Residences of black and liberal political figures, offices of politicians,  
Attacks against political targets 
Civilian 17 8% 
Indiscriminant attacks on pedestrians 
Attacks against civilians after 1990,  
Activist 16 8% 
Anti-apartheid activists, participants in peace rallies 
Attacks against activists  
Election 14 7% 
Election workers, candidates, monitors, workers at polling stations 
Attacks against polling places, election personnel, election candidates, 
after 1990 
NP 10 5% 
Offices of the National Party, residences of Party members 
Attacks against the National Party, after 1985 
Railway 9 4% 
Railway lines, railway personnel 
Attacks against railway targets from 1990 forward, explosives 
Union 8 4% 
Offices of labor unions, labor organizer 
Attacks against unions 
Funeral 5 2% 
Funeral vigils, funeral processions 
Attacks against civilians during funerals, after 1990, involving firearms 
News 2 1% 
News professional, news broadcast facility 
Criticism of segregation policies 
Police 1 0% 
Police professional attacked by security forces according to TRC 







Unknown Terrorist Attacks in Perspective 
 
There were a total of 958 unknown/unclaimed attacks in the data.  One of the 
goals of the analysis is to gain a better understanding of the source of the unknown 
attacks.  One way of doing this is to compare the trends and patterns of unknown 
attacks with anti-apartheid and separatist attacks and fatalities.  In order to put these 
data in context, I include three graphs to compare these unknown incidents with anti-
apartheid and separatist attacks by target, attack and weapon type.  Figure 5 
demonstrates that the targets of unknown attacks include civilian, police, business, 
and transportation targets.  Anti-apartheid groups were more likely to attack police, 
government and business targets.  Separatist attacks were committed mostly against 
civilian, transportation and oppositional political targets (ANC). 


















Figure 6 shows the method of attack used by anti-apartheid, separatist and 
unknown groups.  Anti-apartheid groups were more likely to use bombs and 
explosives; whereas, pro-apartheid groups tended to rely on assassinations and armed 
assaults.  This difference is likely a reflection of the differences in target 
selection.  Anti-apartheid groups were more likely to perpetrate attacks against non-
civilian targets, such as the police, government and military targets and the ANC, in 
particular, initially focused its campaign on structures rather than people.  Unknown 
groups relied more on assassinations and armed assaults.  Unknown groups used 
bombings to a much less degree than anti-apartheid and separatist groups. 
 























According to Figure 7, unknown and anti- apartheid attacks appear to increase 
around the same time frame; however by 1988, anti-apartheid attacks begin to drop 
off.  Unknown attacks begin to drop off slightly during this time, but by 1991, they 
begin to increase again.  There is a slight increase in anti-apartheid incidents between 
1990 and 1994, but this increase is not as dramatic as the unknown incidents.  
Additionally, the unknown incidents are much higher overall and last longer than the 
anti-apartheid incidents. 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of Unknown and Anti-Apartheid Incidents 
 
 
The trends in Figure 7 above and Figure 8 below are comparable.  Unknown 
and anti-apartheid fatalities begin to increase in the early 1980s; however, the 
unknown fatalities are more intermittent and less lethal prior to 1990 when compared 
to anti-apartheid fatalities.  Again, there is a temporary decrease in anti-apartheid 








































































































fatalities, on the other hand, increase dramatically from 1990 and begin to decline 
rapidly after 1994.  Unknown attacks were more lethal than anti-apartheid attacks.   
 




 Figure 9 is a comparison of unknown and separatist incidents. The unknown 
incidents begin to rise earlier than the separatist attacks, which begin to increase 
around 1989.  Unknown attacks begin to increase in the mid 1980s.  After 1990, 
however, the separatist attacks and unknown attacks appear to have a similar 
trajectory, although there are fewer incidents committed by separatist forces.  
























































































































Figure 10 is a comparison of separated and unknown fatalities.  The 
trajectories of these two series’ are visually more similar that the comparison of 
unknown fatalities and anti-apartheid fatalities.  Based on this visual inspection, it 
appears that unknown cases prior to 1990 are more similar to anti-apartheid cases and 








































































































Figure 10: Comparison of Unknown and Separatist Fatalities 
 
 The tables above show that there is quite a bit of overlap among the groups in 
terms of target and attack type and trends over time; however, there are some 
interesting differences.  Unknown groups were overwhelmingly responsible for 
attacks against civilian targets, while anti-apartheid groups focused more on police, 
government and military targets.  The selection of targets by anti-apartheid groups 
resulted in fewer deaths overall, compared to both separatist and unknown groups.  
Thus, the lethality of separatist and unknown attacks was higher.  Figure 10 is quite 
compelling.  The trends in fatalities for unknown and separatist groups are very 
similar between 1990 and 1995, suggesting the presence or activity of third force 
operatives.  If this were the case, then it would serve as an example of state actors 
engaged in terrorism against the population.  It is difficult to support this assertion 
without further information on the incidents.  Indeed, it is possible that the unknown 
incidents are a combination of state-sponsored violence, anti-apartheid violence, 







































































































Choice of Time Interval and Time Span 
            The time span of the data is from 1970-2010.  Although these dates are based 
on data availability, the time frame captures the onset and decline of terrorist violence 
in South Africa during the transition from apartheid to democracy. The choice of time 
intervals is an important issue in time series analysis and can be difficult when 
dealing with terrorism (Sheehan, 2009).  Time series analysis requires sequential 
units of observation evenly spaced over time, i.e. yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly, 
daily, etc. Terrorism is not a continuous phenomenon; therefore, it is possible to have 
several time intervals with no observations. Creating shorter intervals may increase 
the number of observations, but may produce bias in the estimates because there are 
not enough pre-and post-intervention observations to capture trends or seasonality in 
the data (Cook and Campbell, 1979).   
I ran exploratory analyses for monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and yearly 
time intervals.  The monthly and quarterly data proved difficult to model, due to the 
high number of zeros, especially at the beginning of the time series.  The semi-annual 
and yearly data, however, were adequate and provided enough pre and post 
intervention observations within each time interval to conduct quantitative analyses.   
Variables 
The dependent variables that I use in this dissertation include known anti-
apartheid attacks, known anti-apartheid fatalities, known separatist attacks, known 
separatist fatalities, unknown attacks, and unknown fatalities.  As noted above, 




oppositional terrorist groups against the apartheid government.  Separatist 
attacks/fatalities are those known to have been committed by groups attempting to 
maintain an ethnically centered government.  Unknown attacks/fatalities are those 
that were not attributed to any particular group. I include measures of the annual and 
semi-annual frequencies in relation to the selected interventions.  I also analyze 
fatalities to explore the lethality of ethnic terrorism in South Africa.   
The intervention variables include the month and year during which the four 
major legal and political events described above occurred.  As previously discussed, I 
examine two socio-legal interventions and two political interventions.  The two socio-
legal interventions are the repeal of pass laws, which occurred in the second half of 
1986 and the repeal of the race classification system, which occurred in first half of 
1991.  The political interventions are the legalization of oppositional political 
parties/release of Nelson Mandela, which occurred in the first half of 1990, and the 
first democratic election, which was held in the first half of1994. The interventions 
are dummy coded so that 1 specifies the half-year when the intervention occurred and 
0 indicates that the intervention had not yet occurred when modeling permanent 
changes.  In the case of a temporary intervention, the dummy code is 1 while the 
intervention is in effect and 0 when it is not.  
I also included control variables in my analysis to account for the possibility 
that other macro level indicators influenced levels of terrorism and fatalities from 
terrorism.  The control variables I have chosen are the annual homicide rate, annual 
population growth, annual GDP growth, and annual inflation.  I also included a 




Controlling for homicide is important in research on South Africa, a nation 
that has one of the highest homicide rates in the world (McCafferty, 2003).  The 
finding of a relationship between crime and collective action has been mixed.  The 
relevance to the present study is that terrorism has been identified as form of 
collective action (Alimi, 2006), and during the period under investigation, the 
homicide rate increased along with terrorism. Researchers have previously examined 
links between crime and collective action.  Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975) found that 
collective action and crime varied independently in Germany, France and Italy 
between 1830 and 1930.  In another cross national comparison, Gurr (1976) observed 
that crime waves had a tendency to occur during times when there were high levels of 
civil disorder in London, Stockholm, Calcutta, and New South Wales.  LaFree and 
Drass (1997) argue that a complicated relationship exists between collective action 
and crime. They propose a “jump start hypothesis” where crime and collective action 
have an asymmetrical relationship:  they begin to increase at the same time, but then 
collective action decreases at a much faster rate than crime. It is important to note that 
I am not specifically examining the relationship between terrorism and homicide in 
my analysis, I added the homicide rate variable into the analysis to control for its 
possible influence on levels of terrorism. I acquired annual homicide data collected 
by the South African Police Services on homicides from 1970 – 2010 (South African 
Police Services, 2010; McCafferty, 2003).  
I obtained data on the three additional variables from the World Bank (2012) 
World Development Indicators Database spanning 1970-2010.  Population has been a 




has been associated with increased inequality and increased crime rates, as larger 
numbers of people compete for the same finite economic resources (Crenshaw, 
Ameen, and Christenson, 1997).  The population growth variable measures the annual 
percentage of changes in the population. Economic indicators have also been 
associated with political stability (Aisen and Veiga, 2006); thus, I include two 
economic variables in the analysis.  Inflation is a measure of the overall increase in 
prices during a particular period and has been linked to crime.  Previous research 
suggests that increases in inflation reduce the capacity of a community to exert formal 
and informal control over deviant behavior (LaFree and Drass, 1996; Hibbs, 1973). 
GDP growth also has a relationship to decreases in poverty (2006).  I use GDP 






Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is semi-annual (6 month) time intervals. The method I 
have chosen to analyze the data is time series intervention analysis.  Specifically, I 
use time series intervention regression techniques to examine the relationship 
between the selected time series’ and interventions.  This method is a quasi-
experimental design that has been applied to longitudinal data in order to examine the 
impact of interventions on time series data (Box and Tiao, 1975; Campbell and 
Stanley, 1963) in a variety of contexts including the impact of seatbelt legislation on 
deaths from auto accidents (Bhattachargya, 1979), the effect of anti drinking and 
driving advertisements on traffic accidents (Murry, Stam and Lastovicka, 1993), the 
relationship between the Cincinnati Riot of 2001 and robbery arrests (2009), the 
impact of the Global War on Terrorism and levels of worldwide terrorist activity 
(Sheehan, 2009).  In interrupted time series analysis, the time prior to the intervention 
represents the control group, while the time period after the intervention represents 
the experimental group (Berk, Sorenson, Weib, and Upchurch, 2003). 
ARIMA methods correct a major problem with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of time series data (McDowell, McCleary, Meidinger, and Hay, 1980). 
With time series data, the assumption of non-autocorrelation may be violated because 
observations that occur closely in time may be correlated with one another.  For 
example, crime rates in one period may be related to crime rates in subsequent 
periods.  Importantly, the parameter estimates are not incorrect per se, because in the 




(Ostrom, 1979:21), resulting in unbiased parameter estimates that do not 
systematically differ from population parameter estimates. However, conducting 
statistical significance tests may be problematic when serial correlation is not 
modeled or accounted for in the regression equation. ARIMA techniques correct the 
potential for problematic residuals by modeling the underlying structure of the time 
series (Sheehan, 2009; Box & Jenkins, 1970).  
In my analysis, I used Eviews 7 (2000-2012) software to examine the data. 
Traditional ARIMA modeling involves a univariate analysis of the dependent 
variable.  Because I include control variables in the analysis, the ARIMA models 
actually become ARMAX models and require that I include the covariates when 










I evaluated each model for stationarity and, if necessary, differenced the series 
to remove drift and trend and then ran OLS regressions of each time series with the 
independent variables and a constant included.  Some of the series were not stationary 
Y
t 
= the time series 
β = coefficient 
X
t
 = covariate at time t 
p = autoregressive parameter 
Φ = coefficient 
q = moving average parameter 
Θ = coefficient 
Z
t 




after differencing, so I logged the dependent variable to achieve stationarity (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979: 288).  I then examined each series to determine whether serial 
correlation was present.  If serial correlation was present, I selected the appropriate 
number of AR parameters.  I also examined the series for the presence of moving 
averages.  As noted above, data were missing for the year 1993.  Eviews (2000-2012) 
uses listwise deletion to deal with missing data, which has no impact on developing 
autoregressive models; however, Eviews requires a continuous data set when testing 
for moving averages.   
As described above, I calculated the total number of attacks for 1992 and 1994 
and the divided by 2 in order to obtain the number of attacks at the half-yearly level 
for anti-apartheid, separatist and unknown attacks and fatalities for 1993.  In order to 
determine whether the models required MA parameters. I ran models with and 
without the imputed data and compared the results. I used diagnostic tests to ensure 
that the ARMAX models were white noise.  Specifically, I examined three indicators 
of serial correlation: the Durbin Watson statistic, the correleogram of the residuals 
and the Breush-Godfrey LM Serial Correlation Test (LM Test).  Finally, I added in 
the intervention variables to each model to test for relationships.   
 
Types of Interventions 
Prior to including an intervention into a time series model, one must ascertain 
the onset and duration of the intervention.  Onset refers to whether the intervention is 
gradual or abrupt, while duration indicates whether the intervention is temporary or 




abrupt permanent, abrupt temporary, gradual permanent, and gradual temporary.  




Table 4.6: Possible Intervention Forms 
 Permanent Duration Temporary Duration 




Gradual Onset Gradual Permanent Gradual Temporary 
(Difficult to Model) 
 
The transfer function model for the abrupt, permanent change is Yt = ωIt + 
Noise, where ω is the parameter or coefficient used to interpret the magnitude of the 
change and I is the intervention variable (intervention at time t) (Cook and Campbell, 
1979). When an abrupt, permanent change occurs, the time series shifts in level from 
pre-treatment to post-treatment phase (McDowall et al., 1980).  The intervention 
variable is a dummy coded variable that is equal to 0 prior to the intervention and 
equal to 1 after the intervention.  The transfer function for the gradual, permanent 
change is created by adding the lag of the dependent variable to the right hand side of 
the equation, changing the model to:  Yt = δ Yt-1 + ωIt + noise.  The lagged dependent 
variable = δ and represents the rate at which the change in the post-intervention 
observations occurs  (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  A rapid change is indicated by a 




The transfer function for the abrupt, temporary change is created by redefining 
It as a pulse function, Yt = δ Yt-1 + ωPt + noise (McDowell et al., 1980).  In this case, 
the intervention variable, Pt is = 0 during the pre-intervention phase, then = 1 at the 
occurrence of the intervention, and then subsequently = 0.  In this case, the δ also 
indicates the rate of change in the time series.  Cook and Campbell (1979:265) refers 
to this type of effect as a “decaying spike” in that the intervention has a dramatic 
effect at the time of the intervention, but then steadily fades until the series reaches 
the pre-intervention level.  The selection of the appropriate form of the intervention 
should be based on theoretical grounds or is done through rival hypotheses testing 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979), although it is possible to test all three intervention forms 
functions in the analysis.  In this dissertation, I ran models for all three transfer 
functions to determine which is optimal in the final analysis. 
 
Table 4.7: Error structure of ARMAX models for time series 
Annual ARMAX Model 





Separatist Fatalities log(2,0,0) 
Unknown (1,2,0) 
Unknown Fatalities (1,2,0) 
 
 
Time Series Limitations 
It is important to note that there are some weaknesses to the design of time 




a causal relationship between the intervention and changes in the series under 
investigation.  Another major problem is the potential impact of history.  However, 
time series regression allows one to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis of system 
level changes (West, Biesanz and Pitts, 2000) by taking the trend of the series into 
account prior to the intervention.   
Reliability or consistency in the measurement of the data is of prime concern 
with time series data, which often comes from archival sources.  Inconsistent 
measurement presents a threat to validity, which refers to the extent to which an 
instrument measures what it is supposed to measure.  This issue was present in the 
collection of the GTD data, where data from 1970 to 1997 were collected 
prospectively and data collected after 1998 were collected retrospectively. 
Unreliability can be due to either error or systematic bias.  This issue is particularly 
relevant to terrorism datasets that are often generated from information gathered from 
news and media sources.  Indeed, LaFree and Dugan (2007) point out that the vast 
majority of terrorism studies are conducted using secondary data.  Proper training of 
coders reduces the threat of inconsistent data measurement (Sheehan, 2009).  As 
noted earlier in this chapter, coders who received specialized training collected the 
original GTD data.  Researchers at UMD undertook efforts to ensure that rigorous 
data collection procedures were used.  They developed a codebook, held trainings for 
coders, and employed procedures for continuous verification of the data. 
One of the potential problems with reliability in the present research was the 
exclusion of terrorist events that were missed.  As previously noted, collection of the 




may explain why a number of incidents in South Africa were missing.  Without 
access to domestic and local sources of news within South Africa, particularly during 
the time of apartheid, when censorship was strictly enforced, it would have been 
difficult for the original PGIS team to obtain information on many terrorist attacks.  
Additionally, as described above, I was able to identify attacks as either anti-apartheid 
or separatist in some cases by gathering additional information and considering the 
date of the attack, suggesting systematic undercounting in the collection of the data.  
The addition of the terrorist incidents from the Truth and Reconciliation Report 
actually addresses on of the main concerns of reliability because he Report revealed a 
number of incidents that had not been captured in the GTD. Adding in these incidents 
strengthens the reliability and validity of the data by addressing possible selection 
bias.  I further explain this in the following section on validity. 
 
Validity 
As noted above, validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures 
the phenomenon it is supposed to measure (Jaeger, 1990).  Two types of validity are 
important for terrorism research: internal and external (Sheehan, 2009).  Internal 
validity refers to the determination of causality between an independent and 
dependent variable: does X cause Y?  For the present study, internal validity refers to 
a causal relationship between a selected intervention and a selected outcome variable.  
It is important to bear in mind that I am not testing causality in this research; time 
series intervention analysis can only test for relationships or associations between the 




Some of the main threats to internal validity are selection bias, diffusion and 
history (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002).  Selection bias occurs when there is 
systematic exclusion of data.  As noted above, the inclusion of the TRC data address 
selection bias to some degree by supplementing the GTD with missing information on 
terrorist attacks.  Diffusion refers to the rate at which the intervention spreads through 
to the population.  If the diffusion is gradual, there may be a delayed effect of the 
intervention.  The nature of the interventions that I selected suggests rapid diffusion 
because they were widely reported and had a direct and immediate impact on the 
socio-legal and political structures in South Africa.  History refers to the possibility 
that some other event or events that occurred between the pretest and posttest which 
may have exerted an influence on the results (Cook and Campbell, 1979).    
Indeed, during the transition to democracy in South Africa, a number of 
sweeping changes were taking place.  It may be that the repeal of the segregation laws 
or the announcement of the election served as triggers for terrorism increases and 
decreases.  Controlling for history is possible in randomized experiments; however, in 
quasi-experiments the ability to control history is limited.  While I could not include 
every intervention in my analysis, I used theory to inform my selection of 
interventions.  
External validity refers to the generalizability of the research to other contexts 
and/or populations.  Because this is a case study of domestic terrorism in one country 
in Africa, generalizability is limited.  However, this does not mean that important 
insights cannot be gained from this research.  Additionally, because South Africa has 




important to determine to what extent the events in South Africa can be replicated in 
other nations.  
 
 Time Series Analysis using hazard modeling 
In a recent article, Dugan (2011) highlighted additional weaknesses of time 
series intervention analysis.  She noted that problems can arise when interventions 
occur closely in time, making it difficult to disentangle the intervention effects.  I 
faced this issue in the present research because three of the interventions occur within 
a four- year period.  Consequently, I ran each intervention separately and then ran full 
models for each series with all four interventions included.  Another issue is that 
collapsing data into time intervals may compromise temporal ordering and may 
conceal variation in terrorist incidents.  If terrorist events occur prior to the 
intervention within the time interval, these incidents will be treated as if they actually 
occurred after the implementation of the intervention.   
While there is no magic bullet to deal with these difficulties, she 
recommended that lagging the intervention may ameliorate the problem of temporal 
ordering.  In the present study, this issue came up for my interventions because I used 
six-month time intervals, which are relatively wide.  For the pass law repeal, the 
intervention occurred on July 1, 1986, which was the beginning of the second half of 
that year, so no incidents were included prior to the intervention.  Similarly, the 
legalization intervention occurred early in the first half of 1990, on February 2
nd
.  
Three incidents occurred prior to this date, while 80 incidents occurred after the 




interventions.  The race classification intervention was more problematic.  This 
intervention occurred on June 17, 1991.  Forty-five incidents occurred prior to the 
intervention and one occurred after.  For the election intervention, which occurred on 
April 26, 1994, there were 113 incidents prior to the election and 34 that occurred 
after the intervention.  
I ran models with both non-lagged and lagged interventions for the race 
classification and pass law interventions, meaning that I ran the data with the 
intervention occurring in the subsequent six month time interval.  
For the issue of collapsing the data, Dugan (2010) recommends using series 
hazard modeling, a technique that uses Cox proportional hazard modeling.  This 
method uses the characteristics of past events to estimate the changes in the risk of 
subsequent events.  
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I provided a description of the data and methodology that I 
used to test my hypotheses.  As described above, I used ARMAX techniques to model 
the series’ of terrorist attacks and fatalities in South Africa.  I then examined the 
association between changes in the series over time with six macro level 








Chapter 6:  Results 
 
Overview 
In this Chapter, I provide a review of the data.  Because I am dealing with 
time series data, I also describe trends in terrorist activity during the study period.  I 
then provide the results of my analyses.    
 
Trends in Terrorist Activity 
Figure 11 depicts the semi-annual terrorist attacks in South Africa from 1970 
through 2010.  According to the graph, unknown attacks account for the majority of 
attacks.  Anti-apartheid attacks steadily increase from the early 1980s through 1988 
when they peak and drop off quickly.  There is a slight rise in anti-apartheid attacks 
between 1991 and 1994.  Separatist attacks do not begin to increase until the early 
1990s, with three distinctive peaks.  These attacks drop off quickly after 1994. 
 


























































































































Figure 12 depicts semi-annual fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks in 
South Africa from 1970 through 2010.  The fatalities are an indication of the lethality 
of the attacks, and as previously mentioned, ethnic terrorist attacks are predicted to be 
more lethal than other types of attacks (Byman, 1998).  Prior to 1990, attacks were 
less lethal, and anti-apartheid attacks were less lethal overall, with fewer fatalities 
compared to unknown and separatist attacks.  Separatist and unknown attacks were 
more lethal and both increased dramatically between 1990 and 1994.  As with the 
incidents, fatalities began to drop off in1994 for all three types of groups. 
 
Figure 12: Semi-Annual Fatalities from Terrorist Attacks in South Africa (1970-
2010) 
 
Description of Data  
 
Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, control 























































































































majority of the attacks and fatalities from attacks.  Separatist groups committed fewer 
terrorist attacks, but attacks by separatist groups were more much more lethal in 
comparison to the number of attacks.  It is important to note that there are no 
measures of inequality in the data; however, I was able to include some macro level 
economic measures in the models.  The control variables include the annual homicide 
rate, inflation, GDP growth and population growth. I also included the intervention 
variables for both the step and pulse functions, as described in the previous chapter. 
 
Table 6.1:  Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
(n=80) 
 
  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
Semi-Annual Series      
Anti-Apartheid Incidents 8.36 0.5 69 0 15.1 
Separatist Incidents 3.73 0.1 54 0 9.9 
Unknown Incidents 11.97 1.5 97 0 21.86 
Anti-Apartheid Fatalities 9.05 0.1 84 0 18.23 
Separatist Fatalities 8.94 0.1 206 0 30.78 
Unknown Fatalities 14.86 0.1 207 0 34.62 
Control Variables      
Annual Homicide Rate 37.68 34 65.1 21.6 11.99 
Annual Inflation 9.93 10.30 18.65 1.39 4.25 
Annual GDP Growth 2.67 2.98 6.62 -2.14 2.39 
Annual Population Growth 2.03 2.2 2.6 0.96 0.51 
Data Collection Differences 0.31 .00 1 0 .47 
Intervention Variables      
Pass Law Step 0.60 1 1 0 0.50 
Pass Law Pulse 0.03 0 1 0 0.16 
Legalization Step 0.48 0 1 0 0.51 
Legalization Pulse 0.03 0 1 0 0.16 
Race Classification Step 0.50 0.5 1 0 0.51 
Race Classification Pulse 0.03 0 1 0 0.16 
Election Step 0.43 0 1 0 0.50 
Election Pulse 0.03 0 1 0 0.16 






Table 6.2 contains basic descriptive information on the intervention variables, 
including the number of pre and post intervention half-years.    
 
Table 6.2: Intervention Observation Periods 
  
Intervention  Date   Pre-Intervention  Post-Intervention 
Observations  Observations 
Pass Law   July 1, 1986           49  31 
Race Classification      June 17, 1991              40  40 
Legalization   February 2, 1990         38  42 
Election          April 26, 1994          46  34 
 
Results of intervention models 
 
In this section, I describe the results of the analyses.
4
 My predictions for the 
anti-apartheid attacks and fatalities and the separatist attacks and fatalities were one-
tailed tests; consequently, I adjusted the p-values to reflect this in the tables.  As 
mentioned above, some of the series required logging to achieve stationarity (Cook 
and Campbell, 1979).  The coefficients for the logged series may be interpreted as 
percent changes (Sheehan, 2009).   
Table 6.3 contains the results for the anti-apartheid attacks.  The results 
indicated that none of the interventions were associated with levels of anti-apartheid 
attacks.  Table 6.4 contains the results for the anti-apartheid fatalities.   The election 
intervention was associated with an abrupt, permanent decrease in anti-apartheid 
                                                 
4
 I ran models for all the series with the 1993 data.  The results for the models with the 1993 data 
included were comparable to the results without the data.  The one exception was for the separatist 
fatalities.  In the model with the legalization intervention, the results indicated an increase associated 
with the intervention.  However, the significant finding for the intervention disappeared in the full 
model with the 1993 data.  I did, however, leave the 1993 data in the separatist attack model because 
the ARMAX type required a moving average parameter and Eviews requires a continuous series in 




fatalities (-4.23, p<.05).  For the control variables, population growth was associated 
with an increase in anti-apartheid fatalities in the model 1 (1.78, p<.05).  In the full 
model, the significant results remained for the election intervention (-3.52, p<.05.) 
and the results for the control variables were non significant.    
Table 6.5 contains the results for separatist incidents.  None of the results 
were significant in the individual models.  For the full model, the legalization of 
political parties was associated with an increase in separatist attacks (13.39, p<.05).  
For the control variables, the homicide rate was associated with a decrease in 
separatist attacks (-.43, p<.01).  
 Table 6.6 depicts the results for separatist fatalities.  The race classification 
intervention is associated with an abrupt, temporary increase in fatalities from 
separatist attacks (2.90, p<.05; δ=.03**).  The small value of the δ parameter 
indicates that the increase happened quickly.  The inflation variable is also positive 
and significant (.14, p<01).  Additionally, the election intervention is associated with 
an abrupt, permanent decrease in fatalities from separatist attacks (-5.17, p<.01).  The 
homicide rate is also significant (.12, p<.01).  In the full model, the results for race 
classification and the election intervention remain significant, (3.71, p<.01) and (-
4.83, p<.001), respectively.  
 In Table 6.7, the results of the unknown attacks are listed.  For the pass law 
intervention, the results indicate that the repeal was associated with a gradual, 
permanent increase in unknown attacks (14.43, p<.05;  δ =.64**).  The large δ 
parameter suggests that the decline occurred relatively slowly.  The election 




unknown groups (-38.88, p<.05).  In he full model, the results remain consistent, with 
pass laws associated with a significant increase in unknown attacks (33.45, p<.00) 
and the election associated with a decrease in unknown attacks (-54.29, p<.01).   
 Table 6.8 indicates that the election was associated with an abrupt, permanent 
decrease in fatalities from unknown groups (-65.09, p<.05).  There was an increase in 
the homicide rate in relation to the intervention (2.01, p<.05).  For the full model, the 
race classification intervention was associated with an increase in fatalities from 
unknown groups (63.07, p<.01).  The election intervention was associated with a 
decrease in unknown fatalities (-115.80, p<.001.  Additionally, the homicide rate 








Table 6.3:  Results for Anti-Apartheid Attacks, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX (1,2,0) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interventions       
Pass Laws - -7.22 
(9.17) 
   -7.58 
(10.14) 
Race Classification -  -0.08 
(7.46) 
  3.18 
(9.05) 








Control Variables       




































































Table 6.4:  Results for Anti-Apartheid Fatalities, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX ln(2,0,0) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interventions       
Pass Laws - 
1.48 
(.87) 
   1.39 
(.85) 
Race Classification 
-  .45 
(1.40) 
  3.42 
(1.13) 
Legalization 

























































































Table 6.5:  Results for Separatist Attacks, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX(0,1,1) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interventions       
Pass Laws + 
-6.89 
(9.36) 
   2.37 
(.2.15) 
Race Classification 
+  6.93 
(4.09) 
  -2.31 
5.28) 
Legalization 



























































































Table 6.6:  Results for Separatist Fatalities, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX ln(2,0,0) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interventions       
Pass Laws + 
.93 
(.91) 
   .64 
(.70) 
Race Classification 
+  2.90* 
(1.43) 
  3.71** 
(1.09) 
Legalization 


























































































Table 6.7:  Results for Unknown Attacks, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX (1,2,0) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 





   33.45** 
(6.68) 
Race Classification 
-  -6.20 
(14.24) 
  6.93 
(12.07) 
Legalization 




























































































Table 6.8:   Results for Unknown Fatalities, Coefficient Estimates and (SE), ARMAX (1,2,0) 
Variables Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Interventions       
Pass Laws - 
27.35 
(13.59) 
   15.01 
(10.87) 
Race Classification 
-  -1.08 
(20.43) 
  63.07** 
(19.09) 
Legalization 
























































































Although I am not able to establish a direct causal connection between the 
interventions and levels of terrorism, I believe that the results of the analysis provide 
important insight into the dynamics of terrorism in South Africa.  One of the benefits 
of using ARMAX models in regression time series analysis is that the model 
identification process takes into account systematic processes that may confound the 
influence of the intervention by taking into account trends in the data (Pridemore, 
Chamlin and Cochran, 2007).  The results generally support the hypotheses.  
Separatist attacks increased in relation to the legalization of oppositional political 
parties and fatalities from separatist attacks increased in relation to the repeal of the 
race classification law.  Unknown attacks increased in relation to the repeal of the 
pass laws and fatalities from unknown attacks increased in relation the race 
classification intervention.  For the election intervention, anti-apartheid attacks and 
separatist attacks were not significant; however anti-apartheid and separatist fatalities 
and unknown attacks and fatalities all showed significant decreases in relation to the 










Chapter 7:  Discussion 
 
Overview 
I began this dissertation by arguing that the South African government 
generated intergroup conflict through the implementation of the apartheid system, 
which was in essence based on ethnic privilege. In this chapter, I discuss the findings 
of my analyses. I also discuss the implications of my findings and will highlight some 
important limitations in this research.  I then discuss the policy implications of my 
findings and discuss future directions for research.   
Findings 
There were dire predictions that the extreme right and separatist forces would 
persist in terrorism even after the elections (Southern, 2008).  This, however, did not 
occur.  Despite the surge in unknown and separatist terrorism during the transition to 
democracy, violence quickly decreased according to the data after the election.  The 
results of the analysis tend to support the Smith (2000), who argued that the 
implementation and establishment of democratic institutions could lead to decreases 
in ethnic conflict. The democratic election in South Africa was associated with 
significant decreases in terrorist violence from unknown groups and decreases in 
fatalities for anti-apartheid, separatist and unknown groups studied in this 
dissertation.  These findings suggest that once legitimate democratic structures are in 
place, reliance on terrorist violence decreases because groups with grievances have 




Additionally, a Marsh and Szayna (2000) argue, governments may engage in 
accommodative strategies and bargaining to protect their status as changes occur in 
the power structure.  In South Africa, whites were, for the most part, able to maintain 
their privileged status even after the transition to democracy.  Although it is not 
possible to say for certain whether the unknown attacks were committed by separatist 
groups or a third force, the results suggest that the unknown attacks are more similar 
to separatist incidents than to anti-apartheid incidents.  Thus, as predicted by power 
threat theory (Blalock, 1967), when a dominant group faces a loss of power, members 
of that group may engage in acts of violence against the subordinate group. However, 
as the formerly subordinate group are able to mobilize effectively and achieve 
sufficient political power, attacks against them should decrease.  
Theoretical Implications 
 
The theoretical implications of this research are limited because I did not 
directly test any theory.  Rather, I derived insights from theories of intergroup 
relations to develop my hypotheses. One of the potential theoretical implications has 
to do with the two traditional measures of threat that have been used in previous 
analyses in the power threat hypothesis (Blalock, 1967).  These measure are minority 
population size and economic conditions.  Chamlin (2009) points out that it may be 
more useful to add in direct measures of intergroup threat in a time series design in 
order to determine whether policies and procedures change in response to the threat.  
Another theoretical implication of this research lies in the value of considering 




ethnicity may be important in the United States as it continues to respond to the 
growing population of Hispanics (Etile and Taylor, 2008). Holmes et al. (2008) argue 
that research on minority threat has relied too heavily on race, and that more focus 
should be placed on ethnic distinctions.  As Market (2008) has noted, Hispanics may 
face discrimination in the United States due to the perception that they are in the 
country illegally and that they are reluctant to give up their native language.   
This research may have theoretical implications concerning the role of 
grievances in generating conflict and terrorism. The findings of this research suggest 
that grievances do matter and that inequality in the polity may be more important than 
inequality in the socio-legal realm.  Although the laws have been changes, black 
South Africans continue to face high levels of economic inequality, yet terrorist 
violence has virtually disappeared.  New grievances have been generated on the part 
of the Afrikaners who lost power; however, they have access to the political system in 
order to address their grievances (Southern, 2008).  
 
Limitations 
There are important limitations to the present research that must be discussed.  
First, this analysis only examines whether there is an association between the 
interventions and levels of terrorism; consequently, I am unable to say that the 
interventions caused any of the decreases or increases in attacks or fatalities.  
Additionally, the theories that I discuss are not actually being tested; rather, they are 
used to provide important contextual information to the analysis and provide a 




Another limitation is the presence of a large number of unknown terrorist 
attacks in the data, which limits my ability to say for certain whether anti-apartheid or 
separatist groups committed the attacks.  The results of the analysis suggest that these 
incidents are a combination of the two, with the unknown anti-apartheid incidents 
occurring prior to 1990 and the unknown separatist incidents occurring after 1990.  
Finally, the research design was a quasi-experimental analysis, which means that I did 
not have the ability to control for the impact of other factors on levels of terrorism.   
 
Policy Implications 
This research suggests that grievances do have a role in terrorist violence, 
which challenges one of the main beliefs about terrorism (LaFree, 2008).  It is 
important to note that resolving grievances in favor of one group may trigger 
grievances by other groups that feel threatened by changes, particularly when 
grievances are based on ascribed characteristics such as ethnicity or race. de Mequita 
(2005) suggests that increases in violence after the implementation of significant 
government reforms may be the result of a rift between those who hold moderate and 
extremist views.  In other words, moderate groups are more likely to accept 
concessions by the government, while those holding extremist views work to 
undermine the process of negotiations (Kydd and Walter, 2002).  One of the benefits 
to the government is that former terrorists who adopt more moderate views can 
become a resource by assisting government forces in countering extremist terrorists 




In South Africa, terrorist violence dramatically increased between 1990 and 
1994, during the transition to democracy and much of this violence was committed by 
unknown and separatist groups.  The evidence of a third force uncovered by the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission suggests that, although the government did not 
officially sanction these activities, it took on a passive role in dealing with the 
violence.  Thus, another policy implication is that sources from within the 
government, particularly security forces, may become a source of non-sanctioned 
violence from rogue agents.  Efforts should be made to assess the level of 
disagreement on the part of agency members with the policy changes to ensure that 
they do not become part of a campaign to undermine negotiations.  Swift and 
deliberate action to confront these sources of violence is imperative to preserve the 
legitimacy of the government during times of transition.  One of the problems with 
South Africa was the government’s reluctance to deal with the security forces that 
were identified early on by the Human Rights Watch (1991) as a source of terrorist 
violence.  
The results of this research suggest that resolving political grievances may be 
more imperative to decreasing terrorism than resolving inequality based grievances.   
If governments plan to make changes in a slow, incremental fashion, they may need 
to shift resources to counter-terrorism efforts to address the potential surge in 
violence as expectations rise.  On the other hand, they may want to consider making 
meaningful political changes on a more accelerated basis, which could stave off 




a critical component and providing a timeline of changes could help in preventing 
unrealistic demands on the part of opposing parties. 
An important policy question is whether the case of South Africa is applicable 
to other nations.  There are a number of factors that limit the relevance of South 
Africa to other conflicts (Athiemoolam, 2003).  First, the population dynamic was in 
favor of the black majority.  Also, the economic interdependence of the white and 
black populations made resolving issues paramount to the economic survival of the 
state.  A major benefit for South Africa was that it already had democratic structures 
in place, although access was unequally distributed, which provided a context within 
which negotiations could take place between the government and opposing forces.  
Perhaps most importantly, white South Africans did not lose their economic status as 
a result of the changes.   
Many nations facing terrorism are not comparable.  For example, Israel has 
encountered enormous challenges in dealing with terrorist violence and some make 
comparisons to South Africa, going so far as to characterize Israel’s policy toward the 
Palestinians as apartheid (Carter, 2007).  The population dynamics, lack of economic 
interdependence, religious differences, and involvement of third parties in the 
negotiations make it difficult for the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be 
resolved in a manner similar to that of South Africa (Adam, 2002).   
South Africa’s greatest contribution comes from its approach to addressing 
ethnic status.  The fear of the Afrikaners was that the new government would exact 
revenge for years of oppression by structuring society in favor of non-whites.  Rather 




included constitutional recognition of ethnic differences (Szeftel, 1994).  In this way, 
leaders were able to preserve and reinforce the value of ethnicity without using it as a 
means for distributing access to rights and privileges (Murray and Simeon, 2010).  
One of the more interesting developments that addressed Afrikaner fears was the 
creation of Orania in 1990, as an all-white, Afrikaner community recognized and 
sanctioned by the government (Meyer, 2011). The death of Eugene Terreblanche, 
leader of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB), at the hands of itinerant black 
farmworkers in 2010 renewed fears of terrorism by Afrikaner separatists (Flanagan, 
2010).  Concerns of ethnic related violence have not disappeared from South Africa 
and most likely never will. 
 
Future Directions 
Future studies should consider socio-legal and political interventions as part of 
counter-terrorist initiatives in other nations facing terrorism.  Additional research on 
ethnic terrorism should be conducted in order to gain a more complete understanding 
of this form of intergroup conflict.  An in depth analysis of the confessions from the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission should also be conducted.  These confessions 
not only provide important details of terrorist incidents, they also provide insight into 
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